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Introduction
Equality of opportunity is the most fundamental characteristic of any fair society.
In Economics, equity often comes at the expense of efficiency. Income taxes are a
famous example of this trade-off as lowering taxes is thought to incentivise produc-
tivity while it limits the resources available for redistribution. However, there are
some policies that can increase both equity and efficiency. Investment in education
is one of those examples. Equity in education increases both fairness and efficiency
by enabling everyone in the economy to achieve their full potential. Nonetheless,
in the UK, pupils who are eligible for free-school-meals, compared to more advan-
taged pupils, lag 9.5 months behind in educational attainment at the end of primary
school (Education Endowment Fund (2018)).
Whilst social mobility in the UK is on the rise, with 43% experiencing an increase
in living standards compared to their parents, access to careers remains strongly
segregated by socioeconomic backgrounds. According to the Social Mobility Report
(2017), most traditional professions, such as doctors, lawyers and academics, in the
UK are still firmly in the hands of those from high socioeconomic backgrounds and
an average pay gap between working class and professional backgrounds of £6,800
p.a. documents that the divide persists also within professions.
In the first chapter of this thesis, I focus on the demand side of this issue by
testing whether the inequality in the demand for professional jobs is reflected in
the inequality in the demand for education. If the link exists, raising demand for
careers that require higher levels of education amongst disadvantaged pupils will
contribute to improving equity in education. I analyse the impact on test scores of
an intervention that aims at increasing pupils’ demand for professional careers by
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providing information through careers talks to improve the understanding of the re-
lationship between knowledge about high achieving jobs and performance at school.
I develop a theoretical framework to model the impact of careers talks on the op-
timal level of effort that pupils invest in schooling, which determines performance.
I formalise the effect of novel information on professional careers by adding a high
utility job outcome to the objective function of the pupil, where the probability of
attaining it depends on effort. I also discuss two potential channels that can negate
the positive effect, first, if the careers talk speaker induces distraction during the
subsequent test, or secondly, if the speaker intimidates the pupil and thereby re-
duces the perceived probability of attaining the high utility job.
I use data on careers talks in English schools to test whether pupils in cohorts that
held careers events increased their performance on standardised tests at the end of
primary school. To study the role of the careers talk speaker as the transmitter
of information and understand possible role model effects, I estimate treatment ef-
fects separately for girls and boys with same and opposite gender speakers. I find
that careers talks do not change the performance of pupils on average, but have
a negative effect on Maths and Reading scores of girls, and Maths scores of boys,
when the speaker is male. Estimating heterogeneous treatment effects by regional
views on women’s rights in the labour market, shows that the negative effects on
girls’ and boys’ Maths performance are stronger in regions with more traditional
gender norms. This implies that region specific characteristics that are correlated
with gender norms might be driving these effects.
The main contribution of this paper is to study the effect of careers talks on the
educational attainment of primary school pupils, with emphasis on the difference
in impacts on girls and boys with same gender and opposite gender speakers. I use
novel data on careers talks in English primary schools to estimate the impact of
careers talks by male and female speakers from a range of professional backgrounds
on primary school pupils, thereby adding to the existing evidence which focuses pri-
marily on the influence of female speakers on older children. The results highlight
important heterogeneity in the treatment effects by speaker gender.
In the second chapter, I delve deeper into the specific influence of role models on
aspirations as the mechanism behind the effect on performance. I conduct an ex-
periment in which pupils in treatment schools are exposed to a video intervention
in which a speaker of varying gender with a career in a Maths related area high-
lights the importance of the subject in a variety of careers and in daily life. The
video intervention allows to rule out any systematic differences in speaker quality
across different schools in the treatment group and the variation by gender permits
to disentangle treatment effects for pupils who can relate to the speaker via gender
and those who cannot. For the entire sample, I collect survey data on aspirations
before and after the intervention and data on performance on standardised tests in
Maths and Reading after the intervention including information on test scores in
earlier tests to measure prior attainment.
I find no significant average treatment effect on aspirations or test scores for pupils
who watched the video compared to those who did not. However, I find a positive
effect on Maths test scores for boys with male speakers and also on their degree
aspirations and the self reported difficulty of their dream job, which I use as a mea-
sure of career aspirations. Girls with female speakers are more likely to embrace
a Growth Mindset and the average same gender effect is also positive on subject
specific aspirations in Maths. The fact that these positive effects are only present
in pupils who were exposed to a same gender speaker highlights the importance of
same gender role models as a mechanism. Interactions of the same gender effects
with peer performance illustrate that high achieving female peers act as a substitute
for the speaker in the video for girls whereas these peer effects are not significant
for boys.
The positive effects on boys with male speakers stand in contrast with the negative
effects in the previous chapter. Whilst, estimations in the first chapter show that
the effects are more pronounced in regions with more traditional gender norms,
this is not the case in this chapter where the interactions with gender norms are
insignificant. Since speaker quality in this chapter is uniform across schools, thanks
to the standardised video intervention, while it varies in the first chapter as the
availability of speakers is geographically restricted, this contrast suggests that the
quality of male speakers in regions with more traditional views explains parts of the
negative effects in the first chapter.
These findings contribute to the existing literature by providing experimental evi-
dence for the positive effect of same gender role models on primary school pupils’
aspirations for education and Maths in particular, and Maths test scores. This work
adds to the results in the previous chapter and the related literature by using survey
data to explicitly document the effect of role models on non-cognitive skills such
as aspirations as drivers of the impact on test scores. Furthermore, the controlled
video intervention allows to, first, isolate the effect of relatability via gender from
any speaker specific effects, and secondly the randomised design to clearly identify
the causal effect by ruling out bias in the estimations.
In the last chapter, I am concerned with optimal risk sharing behaviour to yield
the best informal insurance protection in the absence of formal insurance products.
The poor in many rural parts of the developing world do not have access to formal
insurance providers and must rely on risk sharing agreements with peers to protect
themselves from the consequences of adverse shocks to their income that arise from
weather conditions or illness. Since a steady income flow is a prerequisite for in-
centivising investments in children’s education, informal insurance is an important
tool to promote social mobility and to prevent the income gap between rich and
poor from widening further.
In the analysis, I focus on the optimal choice of risk sharing partners with respect
to people’s risk profiles. I develop a model that links the optimal choice to the risk
variance and covariance of idiosyncratic shocks of two utility maximising agents and
show that in equilibrium, risk sharing will take place between agents with similar
shock variances and negative covariances of their idiosyncratic shocks.
I test these theoretical implications empirically using data on an insurance network
in a rural Tanzanian village and find a strong correlation between the probability
of risk sharing and the similarity in people’s shock variance as measured by their
level of riskiness based on the diversification of their income profiles. I also find
evidence for a correlation between insurance links and negative shock covariances
as measured by the covariance of income profiles, but this correlation is not signifi-
cant when I include the similarity of shock variances as a regressor. These results
suggest that these risk sharing agreements adhere to the optimal allocation in the
model, but that observed behaviour is less likely to deviate from the equilibrium
implications regarding similar shock variances than negative shock covariances.
There are two main contributions of this work to the existing literature. First, I
derive a model of the endogenous formation of informal insurance links that allows
for non-zero covariances between idiosyncratic shocks, thereby extending the frame-
work by Jaramillo et al. (2015). Secondly, this is the first paper to empirically test
whether observed risk sharing agreements comply with the theoretical implications
on the role of risk profiles of insurance partners. Whilst previous papers have dis-
cussed the importance of counter related shocks to ensure insurability, this work is
the first to test this directly.
To conclude, the first two chapters of this thesis discuss the importance of knowledge
about labour market opportunities and professional role models and aspirations in
improving educational attainment of primary school pupils to lay the foundation for
greater career choice and professional success in the future. Both chapters highlight
strong differences in the magnitude and direction of the effect by gender, and more
research is needed to determine the long run effects on career choice and income.
The last chapter focuses on informal insurance as a tool to smooth consumption
and incentivise investments in the future, such as children’s education, and studies
the optimal allocation of risk sharing partners with respect to their risk profiles. I
find that observed risk sharing largely adheres to the equilibrium implications of
the model, which prescribe that utility maximising risk sharing takes place between
agents with similar shock variances and negative shock covariances.

Chapter 1
The Effect of Labour Market
Information on Educational
Achievement: Evidence from Careers
Talks in UK Primary Schools
Abstract
In the UK, a child of working class background is 2.3 times more likely to
enter a working class job compared to children with higher socioeconomic
background. One possible driver of this inequality is an unequal distribu-
tion of knowledge about high achieving careers that creates inequality in the
demand for careers, which might decrease motivation and performance at
school. In this paper, I focus on this channel by studying the impact of
providing information about high achieving careers through careers talks on
increasing motivation and educational achievement of primary school pupils in
end-of-year standardised tests. The results show that the average treatment
effect of attending a careers talk is insignificant for both Maths and Reading
outcomes, but disentangling the effects by pupil gender each with male and
female speakers respectively highlights that both genders when exposed to
male speakers have significantly lower test scores in Maths, and girls also in
Reading, compared to the control group. Interactions of the treatment effects
with measures of regional gender norms suggest that the negative effects on
boys and girls on Maths test scores are amplified in regions with more tradi-
tional gender views.
JEL codes: I24, I26, J16
Keywords: educational inequality, labour market information, role models
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Chapter 1 2
1.1 Introduction
Whilst social mobility in the UK is on the rise, career choices are still highly segre-
gated by socioeconomic background, which constitutes one explanation for why 45%
of earning inequalities are passed from parents onto their children. According to
the Social Mobility Report (2017), a child of working class background is 2.3 times
more likely to enter a working class job compared to children with higher socioe-
conomic background. Similarly, children whose parents work in professional jobs
are 2.5 times more likely to pursue a professional career themselves than children
from less advantaged backgrounds. These figures raise questions about the drivers
of this inequality of opportunity. Possible explanations include discrimination in
the hiring process based on social class or disadvantages that arise due to nega-
tive social network effects for workers from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. This
might lead to an unequal distribution of knowledge about high achieving careers
that can create inequality in the demand for these careers, which in turn might
decrease motivation and performance at school if lower achieving jobs require less
education. In this research, I focus on this channel by studying the impact of the
provision of information about high achieving careers through careers talks on in-
creasing motivation and educational achievement of primary school pupils.
Children acquire a significant part of their knowledge about future career options
through family and friends, therefore the socioeconomic status of the child can in-
fluence the knowledge they can gain. Families of low socioeconomic background are
less likely to work in high-achieving jobs, likewise other people with whom the child
will be surrounded, due to social segregation. Consequently, careers talks in schools
are becoming an increasingly popular instrument to expand pupils’ knowledge on
career options. In these talks, speakers from the world of work discuss their jobs
and professional backgrounds with pupils in an effort to increase motivation and
thereby improve performance. In this paper, I use data on careers talks in English
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primary schools during the school year 2014/15 and 2015/16 to provide evidence
on their effectiveness in improving educational outcomes.
The aim of careers talks is to provide pupils with labour market information on ca-
reer options that they do not yet know about through family or the media, and to
discuss entry paths into these jobs. In this paper, I develop a theoretical framework
in which job outcomes determine the level of effort pupils invest into schooling. In
the model, pupils are introduced to a new high utility job outcome through careers
talks, and the probability of attaining it depends on effort. The main implication of
the model is that pupils increase effort in response to the novel information, which
raises performance on tests. Furthermore, I discuss two side effects of the talks
that can negate the positive effect of information on performance either through
distracting the pupil and inducing additional stress during the test, or by reduc-
ing the probability of attaining the high utility job outcome if the speaker appears
unattainable.
In the empirical analysis, I focus on careers talks in English primary schools that
take place during year 5 and year 6 of the two cohorts graduating primary school in
2015 and 2016 by estimating the effect of attending a talk on pupils’ performance
on year 6 standardised tests in Maths and Reading, known as year 6 SATs. I es-
timate heterogeneous treatment effects for pupils who attend a talk by a speaker
of the same gender compared to the opposite gender and disentangle the effects
for boys and girls. The estimations show that girls and boys perform significantly
worse in Maths if they attend a talk by a male speaker, and for girls this effect is
also significant for performance on Reading tests. I find that the effect is stronger
in geographic regions with more traditional views on women’s role in the labour
market, which suggests that the effects are to a certain extent driven by gender
norms or correlated factors such as speaker quality.
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I use data from two different sources that provide information on careers talks, and
pupil level data on test scores and some school characteristics. The first source
contains information on careers events that stems from administrative data from
an educational charity that operates as a platform to facilitate the contact between
schools and volunteer speakers across the UK to organise careers talks. The data
cover all the expressions of interest from primary schools to host an event between
the launch of the charity’s programme in the summer of 2014 and the end of the
school year in 2016. This information includes the number of speakers that a school
invited for a given cohort, the speakers’ names from which I can infer the gender,
and the number of events that took place. This allows to construct a school-cohort
level dataset with information on the number of invites, talks and events for each
of the two cohorts per school that graduated in 2015 and 2016.
I populate the school-cohort level dataset with individual level performance data
by using data on test scores in year 6 standardised test, and year 2 tests to con-
trol for prior attainment, from the National Pupil Database (NPD). In addition to
test scores, the NPD data holds information on pupil gender, school averages of
free-school-meal eligibility by age and school location. Based on this dataset, I can
estimate the effect of the cohort level treatment on individual level test scores.
Identification in this study relies on exploiting variation in the allocation of school-
cohorts to treatment and control group, and further limit the scope for endogeneity
through different sets of individual and school level controls. Selection bias can
arise from three sources in this setting: First, schools actively opt into treatment
by inviting speakers for a careers talk. This poses a concern for identification if
pupils in schools that select into treatment perform systematically better or worse
in year 6 tests than pupils in schools that do not hold career events. To rule out bias
through this channel, I construct the entire sample based on schools that actively
use the platform to invite speakers and use as the control group those cohorts within
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the schools that have not attended a talk. This ensures that no bias can arise from
a correlation between using the platform and other performance enhancing mea-
sures that a school undertakes. In addition to eliminating this bias on the extensive
margin, I include the number of invites to speakers as a covariate to control for the
intensive margin of the effort that schools put into hosting a talk.
The second source of endogeneity arises from the possibility that the likelihood of
a speaker accepting the invite from a school might be correlated with performance.
If speakers prefer to accept invites from schools with lower or higher than average
performance, then this poses a bias in the estimation as treatment is correlated
with the outcome. To account for this, I use the school-cohort structure of the data
to further restrict the sample to only those schools that have hosted a careers talk
for any age group before. If a school held an event for the cohort that graduated in
2015 but not for the one that graduated in 2016, this school will be represented in
the treatment group by the 2015 graduating cohort and in the control group by the
2016 graduating cohort. Additionally, the sample also includes schools that hosted
events for cohorts too young to be included in the estimation, namely any cohorts
that graduated primary school after 2016. A school that only hosted an event for
younger cohorts, the 2015 and 2016 graduating cohorts of that school will both be
part of the control group. Likewise, if both graduating cohorts of a school attended
a careers talk, the school will only appear in the treatment group.
Finally, selection bias can arise from cohort level selection into treatment. This will
be an issue if cohort level characteristics that increase the likelihood of treatment
are also correlated with performance, such as quality and engagement of the co-
hort’s teacher. I partly address this issue by controlling for observable confounders
with four different sets of controls. The first specification includes no controls, the
second a set of ad hoc selected controls, in the third, I use post-double LASSO
regularisation to select a set of controls from the full set of potential covariates, and
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in the fourth I add school fixed effects to the post-double LASSO controls. Even
though the selected controls vary, I find that my results are stable across specifica-
tions, which adds confidence to the hypothesis that treatment is a significant driver
of the estimated effects on test scores. Notwithstanding, I cannot rule out selection
bias from unobservable confounders that are uncorrelated with the covariates in the
model.
The empirical analysis shows that the average treatment effect of attending a ca-
reers talk is insignificant on both Maths and Reading outcomes. Disentangling the
average effects for boys and girls each with male and female speakers respectively
shows that both genders when exposed to male speakers have significantly lower
test scores in Maths, and girls also in Reading, compared to the control group.
When controlling for post-double LASSO selected covariates and school fixed ef-
fects, girls’ performance deteriorates on average by 0.15 standard deviations in
Maths and by 0.11 standard deviations in Reading, whereas the effect on Maths
scores for boys with male speakers is -0.12 standard deviations. Interactions of the
treatment effects with measures of regional gender norms from the World Values
Survey (Inglehart et al. (2014)) suggest that the negative effects on boys and girls
with male speakers on Maths test scores are amplified in regions with more tradi-
tional views on women’s role in the labour force. Quantile regressions show that the
negative effects on girls’ Maths performance are widely spread over the distribution,
and on Reading are more concentrated in the top half of the performance distribu-
tion, whereas the effects on boys are also spread between the second and sixth decile.
These findings seem to imply that any positive effect of the careers talks that arises
due to novel information is negated by negative effects on girls and boys. The nega-
tive effect on girls is compatible with the theoretical predictions about male speakers
inducing additional stress and distraction during tests, for instance by priming girls
on a negative stereotype regarding their aptness for professional success. Under this
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theory, girls who are subject to the negative stereotype that men are more profes-
sionally successful than women might find themselves confronted with the threat
of confirming the stereotype in the subsequent test, which represents a distraction
and can lead to worse performance (Spencer et al. (1999)). However, the related
literature suggests that these effects are temporary as they do not affect long term
effort, and will therefore disappear over time.
The effect on boys is less clearly reflected in the predictions of the model, but it
might be due to boys discounting the probability of achieving a high job outcome
themselves when attending a talk by a speaker whom they consider ‘out of reach’
given their own ability. According to the theoretical predictions, this effect should
be largest on low performing boys as they are most likely to perceive the speakers
as unattainable. However, this is not clearly borne out in the quantile regressions,
which also show negative effects for boys in the top half of the performance distri-
bution. Furthermore, since not only norms but also speakers vary by region, the
heterogeneity in the treatment effect by regional gender norms could also be driven
by regional variation in the quality of speakers.
The main contribution of this paper is to study the effect of careers talks on the
educational achievement of primary school pupils, with special focus on the differ-
ential impacts of same gender and opposite gender speakers. I build a theoretical
model in which utility maximising agents choose the level of effort that they invest
into education. Careers talks provide information on a new high achieving, high
effort job outcome, thereby adding to the set of attainable job options in the utility
function. I also introducing two channels that can negate the positive effect from
the novel information. In the empirical analysis, I use novel data on careers talks
in English primary schools, which allow me to study the impact on the educational
achievement of boys and girls with same and opposite gender speakers separately.
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This paper ties in with a long standing literature on human capital investment and
the relationship between education and inequality. The early literature on the topic
(Becker (1962) and the subsequent book Becker (1964)) discusses human capital as
an input to production, which grows through investments, instead of innate ability
which is constant over time. In this work, Becker highlights education and training
as the most important investments into human capital as measured by later returns
in earnings. Around the same time a series of papers established the link between
education and the observed skewness in the distribution of income. Mincer (1958)
builds a model that relates the unequal distribution of earnings to education, and
Becker and Chiswick (1966) measures the contribution of schooling to income in-
equality in the US. Furthermore, Chiswick (1969) develops a model and conducts a
cross country analysis of the effect of equal opportunity schooling legislation such
as minimum schooling laws on inequality in the UK and the Netherlands. He shows
that minimum schooling laws tend to increase the level and skewness, and decrease
the inequality in income and schooling.
More recent work by Autor (2014) shows that the rising wage premium for high-
skilled labour explains a substantial share of the increase in inequality in many
industrialised countries. In a cross country comparison, Hanushek and Woessmann
(2011) document that a one standard deviation increase in numeracy skills is as-
sociated with 12-15% higher wages in Nordic countries or 28% higher wages in
the US, and that differences in cognitive skills account for a large share of growth
differences between OECD countries, more so than a variety of other economic in-
stitutions (Hanushek et al. (2014)).
By linking family income and credit constraints to child development and schooling,
Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) show that differences in the demand for education by
income also yield unequal investment into children’s schooling. A number of studies
have since focused on the impact of labour market information on educational at-
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tainment, and school and degree choice. Jensen (2010) in the Dominican Republic
and Nguyen (2008) in Madagascar show that increasing the perceived returns to ed-
ucation through provision of information on returns in the labour market increases
years of schooling and performance on tests. Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014) find
that expected returns to education are important determinants of schooling deci-
sions in Mexico.
Furthermore, Hastings et al. (2015) use data from Chile to show that students
have inaccurate beliefs about major specific earnings, Baker et al. (2017) find that
low-income, low-achieving students who apply to low-earning degrees in California
(USA) overestimate salaries by more than 100%, and Reuben et al. (2017) document
that girls have lower earnings expectations than boys. All studies find that labour
market information affects major choice. A recent study by Lergetporer et al. (2018)
analyses the relationship between information on the cost and returns to attending
university and educational aspirations of parents in Germany. They find that the
information increases educational aspirations of parents with and without a univer-
sity degree, however, since the effect is larger on parents with university degrees,
they conclude that the inequality in information does not explain the socioeconomic
gap in educational aspirations.
The careers talks in this paper can be thought of as a similar type of interven-
tion to raise the perceived returns to education by increasing knowledge about high
achieving jobs. I contribute to the existing literature by showing how the effect
of labour market information on primary school pupils’ educational achievement
crucially depends on their relationship to the speaker who acts as the transmitter
of information.
The work most similar to the one in this chapter is a recent study in France by
Breda et al. (2018), which exploits a randomised experiment to study the effect of
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female STEM role models on course choice and college enrolment of high school
pupils. They find a large effect on enrolment in science programmes for high-
achieving girls, and show that the role model effect is stronger if the pupils can
relate to the individual via gender and also ability. In this paper, I add to these
findings by analysing the effect of careers talks on the educational achievement of
primary school pupils, and by disentangling the impact of same gender versus oppo-
site gender speakers for both boys and girls. I show that gender matching matters
significantly and can have adverse effects on both genders.
In the remainder of the paper, I first provide a simple theoretical framework to guide
the interpretation in section 1.2, and lay out the institutional background in section
1.3. In section 1.4, I illustrate the identification strategy, and in section 1.5, I present
the data that I use in the empirical analysis, as well as summary statistics and
balancing tests. In section 1.6, I discuss the estimation and methods, and in section
1.7 the results. I discuss the compatibility of theoretical and empirical results,
and the implications of the limitations of the identification strategy in section 1.8.
Finally, section 1.9 concludes with a summary and suggestions for future research.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
The following framework is intended to model how careers talks might influence
the educational achievement of pupils. The main hypothesis in this work is that
careers talks improve educational achievement by providing novel information on
high achieving, high effort career options being attainable, thereby increasing the
perceived returns to education.
1.2.1 Base Case
The basic setup of the model features an agent who maximises utility from potential
job outcomes through effort. I formalise the effect of novel information from careers
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talks by adding a new high achieving job opportunity θh to the utility function.
The probability of attaining the new job option depends on the level of effort e that
the agent invests into schooling, which in turn determines performance. Let this
probability be p(e), and the probability of attaining the low achieving job option
θL be 1− p(e). Therefore, agents maximise the utility function
max
e
(1− p(e))θL + p(e)θH − 1
2
e2 (1.1)
where 1
2
e2 is the standard quadratic cost function.
Since effort is costly, agents invest effort only if the new high achieving job out-
come provides enough utility to offset the cost. Thus, by providing information on
high-achieving, high utility job options, careers talks will raise effort, and thereby
performance.
1.2.2 Possible Deviations from the Base Case
I discuss two possible mechanisms that might lead the reduced form effect of careers
talks to deviate from this prediction. First, if the reference point of achievement
that the speaker in the careers talk defines, appears unattainable to the pupil, i.e.
the distance between the reference point and the pupil’s subjective belief about
their potential achievements appears too far, the talk might discourage the pupil
instead of motivating them.1 I formalise this scenario as a subjective reduction of
the probability of achieving the high outcome p(e) for all effort levels by a, with
a < 1 if the speaker induced reference point is too distant.
The second channel that might outweigh the positive effect from providing novel
information on high achieving career outcomes is the possibility that speakers cause
additional stress and distraction in pupils during tests, which increases the cost of
1See Genicot and Ray (2017) for a formal discussion.
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effort. Defining this additional cost of effort as s > 1 yields the new utility function
max
e
(1− p(e))θL + p(e)aθH − 1
2
se2 (1.2)
The stereotype threat literature in social psychology suggests that such additional
distraction might be caused by careers talk speakers who remind pupils of a nega-
tive stereotype, such as the negative connotation attached to women’s Maths ability
(Spencer et al. (1999)). The salience of the stereotype might induce the threat of
confirming it, in subsequent tests in pupils, which adds an additional layer of burden
to the test situation and thereby increases the likelihood of self-fulfilling the stereo-
type. According to the theory, priming people on the stereotype will negatively
affect the performance of people who are subject to the stereotype. Experimental
evidence of the theory in Steele and Aronson (1995) confirms that this prediction
will hold for performance in tasks that are diagnostic of stereotyped feature and
also non-diagnostic tasks, which implies that the negative impact could be reflected
also in Reading scores.
The stereotype threat literature focuses only on the effect on tests that take place
immediately after the priming, which is not the case in this setup as the pupils take
the tests up to two years after the careers talk. However, if the speakers leave a
lasting impression of pupils are reminded of the talks when taking the test and the
negative priming becomes salient again, the negative effect could still be at play.
1.2.3 Predictions
The framework implies that careers events will improve performance on standard-
ised tests if pupils learn about new, high utility career opportunities, as these in-
crease the optimal level of effort they invest into schooling. In addition, the model
gives rise to two potential channels that might negate the positive effect and reduce
performance.
Chapter 1 13
First, pupils might discount the probability of achieving the high utility job out-
come at all levels of effort if the speaker appears out of reach compared to pupils’
own perceived ability. A lower probability of attaining the high utility job outcome
leads to a lower optimal level of effort, which reduces performance. This channel
is particularly relevant for low achieving pupils as they are more likely to consider
the speakers unattainable.
The second mechanism that might outweigh the positive effect from providing infor-
mation on a high utility job option in this model is captured by negative associations
that the pupil might connect with the speaker, which distract them during the sub-
sequent test and thereby lower performance. These negative associations might be
related to a negative stereotype that a group of pupils feel reminded of when at-
tending a talk by a speaker of another group. This might include male speakers
reinforcing the negative stereotype about girls’ Maths ability or aptness for profes-
sional success. Furthermore, pupils of an ethnic minority may face this stereotype
threat when attending a talk by a white speaker. Unfortunately, I am unable to
detect the presence of this particular type of stereotype threat as the data does not
contain information on the ethnicity of pupils or speakers.
1.3 Institutional Background
In this project, I collaborate with a charity that serves as a platform for schools
to connect with speakers from the world of work. The platform facilitates contact
with professionals who volunteer to give careers talks in schools. To host an event,
schools initiate the process by inviting speakers for a talk, while invites to speakers
are based on information on their age, gender, preferences regarding geographic
location of events, industry, area of specialisation and a short bio. The platform
does not provide indications of volunteers’ quality. Depending on the format of the
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event, schools send out invites to one or multiple volunteers (which they can either
decline or accept).
The mission of the charity is to foster employer engagement in schools. Conversa-
tions with both the charity and schools suggest that most schools host events to
introduce their pupils to speakers with different professional backgrounds in order
to expand their knowledge of careers beyond those of their parents and to raise
aspirations. Schools may use the platform to reach out to volunteers for a variety
of events, which include, but not limited to, careers weeks, subject specific events
(e.g. Science week), and guest speakers in the morning assembly.
An event takes place if the invited volunteer accepts the school’s invitation. The
primary reasons for volunteers to decline an invite are that they are unavailable on
the day of the event, they face difficulties reaching the school with public transport,
or their professional profile is not suited for the type of event that a school organises.
There is no evidence for strategic acceptance decisions based on school quality,
though this may be a concern in exceptional cases.
1.4 Identification Strategy
Since treatment is not randomly assigned, the setup in this study is susceptible to
selection bias. Participating schools opt into hosting an event and are thus inher-
ently different from schools that do not select in. However, I exploit the unique
nature of the data to reduce the scope for endogeneity substantially. In what fol-
lows, I will first characterise the selection bias that threatens causal identification
in more detail and then propose a remedy.
There are three sources of selection bias. First, schools opt into treatment by sign-
ing up to the platform and inviting speakers. This is the only way to initiate an
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event as the charity running the platform merely facilitates the contact but does
not set up events themselves. Therefore, schools that set up an event are inherently
different from those that do not. To address this source of selection bias, I limit the
sample to only those schools that are signed up to the platform and are actively
using it to invite speakers. This procedure eliminates selection bias from opting into
treatment since all schools in the remaining sample have at least attempted to do so.
The second source of selection bias stems from potential differences in volunteers’
propensity to accept an invite, for instance based on school location or quality.
Volunteers may be more likely to accept an invite if a school is well connected to
public transport or is of higher quality, or the reverse. Either way, the regression
would suffer from omitted variable bias if location and quality were correlated with
test scores. To combat this issue, I exploit the school-cohort panel nature of the
data, which allows to construct a treatment indicator for each cohort per school and
to exclude schools that never held an event (despite sending invites to volunteers)
from the sample. This way, I can eliminate any time-invariant volunteer selection
bias as all schools in the remaining sample hosted at least one careers talk for one
of their year groups during the period of observation. This may include events
for year groups who graduate from primary school after 2016 in which case both
cohorts of interest, those graduating in 2015 and 2016, are included in the control
group. The sample also includes schools where both the 2015 and 2016 graduating
cohorts attended events, which implies that the school is exclusively represented in
the treatment group and not in the control group.
Overall, of the 101 schools in the sample, both cohorts are in the control group in
39 cases, the two cohorts are split between treatment and control in 37 cases, and
in 25 schools, both cohorts are in the treatment group.
Furthermore, to control for any remaining time-invariant bias at the school level, I
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present my main specifications with and without school fixed effects.
Finally, this leaves scope for bias due to selection at the cohort level within a school,
which is a concern for identification if the probability of hosting an event is cor-
related with performance of the cohort. This would require that schools are more
likely to invite speakers if a cohort performs better or worse than the school average,
and / or speakers’ propensity to accept the invitation depends on cohort quality
relative to the school average. While I cannot entirely rule this possibility out, this
should not be a major reason for concern. The data shows that most invites are
targeted jointly at multiple year groups, which suggests that schools rarely target
specific year groups based on their performance. Furthermore, as discussed above,
volunteers’ propensity to accept invites largely depends on fixed school character-
istics such as location, which I control for with school fixed effects, or volunteers’
schedules that can be considered as good as random in this exercise.
To control for any persisting endogeneity, I present estimations for four different
sets of cohort and individual level controls. In the first specification, I estimate the
effect without any controls. Secondly, I choose a set of ad hoc selected covariates, in
the third specification I use a post-double LASSO regularisation to select optimal
controls from a set of potential covariates, and squares and interactions thereof, and
in the fourth one I add school fixed effects to the post-double LASSO controls. For
the LASSO, I follow Belloni et al. (2014) and use a double selection procedure that
first selects from the set of available controls those that best predict treatment and
secondly the outcome. Comparing estimates across specifications will offer some
useful insights into the internal validity of the results, and the finding that the
estimates do not differ significantly across specifications lends some confidence to
the identification strategy. Nonetheless, since data on some important individual
level covariates such as free-school-meal eligibility and measures of speaker and
teacher quality are missing due to data limitations, I cannot rule out that these are
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causing bias to the estimations.
1.5 Data Description & Sample Characteristics
1.5.1 Event Data
The first source of data in this analysis is internal data from the educational char-
ity, covering all invites and communications between schools and volunteers from
the roll out of the program in summer 2014 to summer 2016. In this invite level
dataset, each observation contains an event date and the age group at which the
event is targeted. Based on this information, I construct an event level dataset by
grouping invites by event date and target age. For each event that was initiated,
including those that did not take place, I have information on the number of speak-
ers and their names. Based on the name, I can infer the gender of speakers using
the R package gender that predicts the gender using historical data. From this
information, I can construct the gender share of speakers at an event. I generate a
speaker gender dummy equal to one if more than half of the speakers at an event
were female and zero otherwise. Therefore, the dummy assuming a value of one
implies that a child who participated in this event was more likely to encounter a
female speaker than a male speaker, or in case of a child attending multiple talks
per event, encountered more female than male speakers.
Subsequently, I transform this event level dataset into a panel dataset by school-
cohort. For each school-cohort that graduates from primary school between 2015
and 2016, I observe the events that took place during during year 5 and 6. I do not
observe events from earlier years since the program was rolled out in summer 2014.
Thus, pupils who graduated in 2015 were only affected by events during year 6 and
those who graduated in 2016 in year 5 and 6. For each school-cohort, I construct an
aggregate speaker gender dummy based on the most recent event that the cohort
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attended.
1.5.2 Test Score Data
Secondly, I use data from the NPD on individual level test scores and school level
administrative data. These data contain scores in tests in Reading, Maths and
Writing in year 2 (aged 6 - 7) and year 6 (aged 10 - 11). The latter serve as the
main outcome variables of interest.
In England, primary school pupils take tests in Reading, Writing, and Maths at
the end of year 2, in which achievement is measured on a scale from 0 to 30 where
15 refers to the age related expected level of achievement. The test papers are
standardised, but assessment is not. The results are used primarily to track overall
school performance and do not have a direct effect on pupils educational career.
In year 6, pupils take fully standardised tests (papers and assessment) in Reading,
Maths (and Science) and non-standardised tests in Writing. Here, achievement is
measured on a scale from 1 - 110 in Maths, 0 - 49 in Reading, and Writing on a scale
from 0 - 6. Since Writing tests are not standardised, I exclude this subject from
the analysis. In the regressions, I standardise test scores to a standard deviation of
one and mean zero in the control group.
Similarly to year 2 tests, these tests do not affect pupils directly and they do
not serve as entry exams for secondary schools. However, performance of primary
schools in England is closely monitored and schools and pupils are under significant
pressure to adhere to centralised performance standards. Therefore, these tests
are taken seriously and test scores serve as a reliable measure of pupils’ academic
performance.
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1.5.3 Comparison of Experimental Sample to All English
Primary Schools
Table 1.1: All schools vs. sample
All Schools Sample
Obs Mean Obs Mean Diff(C-T) OLS P-val
Panel A: 2015 Cohort
Test Scores
Maths Year 2 15559 15.33 100 15.20 0.1381 0.59
Reading Year 2 15559 15.37 100 15.11 0.2609 0.33
Writing Year 2 15559 14.03 100 13.89 0.1416 0.57
School Characteristics
Number of pupils 15605 36.33 100 45.00 -8.6706 0.00
Girls 15605 0.48 100 0.49 -0.0131 0.32
% FSM Eligible 15605 4.12 100 6.83 -2.7040 0.00
Population Density (per hectare) 15605 21.16 100 37.58 -16.4191 0.00
Panel B: 2014 Cohort
Test Scores
Maths Year 6 14364 70.87 94 70.78 0.0898 0.92
Reading Year 6 14377 31.18 94 30.32 0.8624 0.03
Maths Year 2 14832 15.29 94 15.34 -0.0516 0.85
Reading Year 2 14832 15.30 94 15.26 0.0358 0.90
Writing Year 2 14832 13.96 94 14.03 -0.0664 0.80
School Characteristics
Number of pupils 14876 35.14 94 45.06 -9.9189 0.00
Girls 14876 1.52 94 1.52 -0.0014 0.92
% FSM Eligible 14875 4.08 94 6.81 -2.7278 0.00
Population Density (per hectare) 14876 21.31 94 39.43 -18.1257 0.00
Note: Balancing tests based on school level data, with unclustered OLS P-values of the dif-
ferences in means reported in the last column. % FSM Eligible refers to an average across
shares of free-school-meal eligible pupils at age 9, 10 and 11 per school. Population Density
(per hectare) is the average number of people per hectare resident in the postcode district of
the school. In panel A, I present school averages for the cohort graduating primary school
in 2015. Since parts of this cohort are included in the sample, I do compare in terms of year
6 test scores. Panel B shows school averages for the cohort graduating primary school in
2014, and since no pupils from this cohort are included in the sample, I also compare year 6
test performance.
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To get a better sense of the schools in the sample and how they fit into the universe of
English primary schools, I compare the schools in the sample to all primary schools
in terms of test scores and school characteristics. In the top panel of table 1.1, I
compare schools based on the school cohorts that graduated primary school in 2014,
and in the bottom panel, the comparison is based on the cohorts that graduated in
2015. In the 2014 comparison, seven sample schools are missing from the statistics
because of missing historic data as they converted to a different school type, which
makes the school identifier codes incompatible. To show how the comparison varies
when all but one sample school is included, I also show the comparison for the 2015
graduating cohorts. Since the year 6 test scores of the 2015 school-cohorts in the
sample are endogenous to treatment, I do not compare year 6 test scores in panel B.
Panel A shows that the sample is representative of all primary schools in the country
in terms of achievement in year 6 and year 2 tests, except in year 6 Reading per-
formance where the sample performed significantly worse than the rest of English
primary schools. As balance tests, I conduct a simple T-test and report P-values
of the two-sided test. P-values on the differences in achievement are far larger than
conventional significance levels, except for year 6 Reading scores. However, schools
in the sample are significantly larger than the average English primary school in
terms of number of year 6 pupils. Furthermore, a larger share of pupils are eligible
for free school meals, which is a measure of deprivation, and sample schools are
located in significantly more densely populated areas.
Panel B shows that the comparison based on the 2015 cohort yields a very similar
pattern. The sample is representative in terms of year 2 performance but schools
are larger, and in more densely populated and deprived locations. These differ-
ences suggest that large schools in deprived, inner-city districts are more likely to
be interested in raising pupils’ aspirations, and to sign up with the careers talks
platform. Whilst these differences do not invalidate the results in this paper, they
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are important in assessing the external validity of the findings. These may not
translate to the average school with fewer pupils, in less densely populated and less
deprived locations if the program became mandatory for all schools including those
that would not otherwise have joined.
1.5.4 Sample Characteristics and Balance Tests
Table 1.2: Balance tests
Control Treatment
Obs Mean Obs Mean Diff(C-T) OLS P-val
Panel A: Test Scores
Year 2 Maths 4752 15.32 3723 15.54 -0.2226 0.25
Year 2 Reading 4753 15.31 3723 15.47 -0.1546 0.47
Year 2 Writing 4754 14.05 3723 14.20 -0.1487 0.49
Panel B: Event Data
Total number events 5069 0.00 3963 1.65 -1.6488 0.00***
Number events year 4 5069 0.00 3963 0.01 -0.0073 0.32
Number events year 5 5069 0.00 3963 0.76 -0.7623 0.00***
Number events year 6 5069 0.00 3963 0.88 -0.8791 0.00***
Total number invites 5069 12.50 3963 50.47 -37.9675 0.00***
Number invites year 4 5069 0.00 3963 0.01 -0.0073 0.32
Number invites year 5 5069 0.00 3963 18.76 -18.7613 0.00***
Number invites year 6 5069 12.50 3963 31.70 -19.1989 0.03**
Panel C: Cohort Characteristics
Number of pupils 115 44.05 87 45.53 -1.4766 0.64
Girl 112 0.49 85 0.49 0.0006 0.96
% FSM eligible 113 8.23 87 8.84 -0.6052 0.50
Population density (per hectare) 115 32.25 87 43.89 -11.6427 0.04
Note: Balancing tests based on pupil level data, with OLS P-values of the differences in means
clustered at the school-cohort level reported in the last column. % FSM Eligible refers to an
average across shares of free-school-meal eligible pupils at age 9, 10 and 11 per school. Popula-
tion Density (per hectare) is the average number of people per hectare resident in the postcode
district of the school.
In table 1.2, I present summary statistics and balance checks for covariates in
the pooled sample of the two cohorts graduating primary school in 2015 and 2016
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that are included in the analysis. As balance tests, I show P-values from regressions
of the form
yi = α + βTi + εi
where yi are the outcomes and Ti is an indicator that turns one when pupil i is in
a treatment cohort, standard errors are clustered at the cohort level.
Panel A shows average test scores per school-cohort in year 2 tests in Maths, Read-
ing and Writing. In all three subjects, cohorts in the treatment group have higher
average test scores than those in the control group. Whilst these differences exist,
the last column shows that they are not significantly different from zero, which
implies that they will not bias the estimates in the analysis. However, they might
be an indication of other unobservable confounders that I cannot control for and
that might threaten the internal validity of the results.
In panel B, I present summary statistics of the event data. The figures show that
pupils in treatment cohorts attended on average 1.65 events, 1% of those took place
during year 42, 46% during year 5, and 53% during year 6. By construction, school-
cohorts in the control group did not hold any events. Notwithstanding, control
cohorts actively used the charity platform to invite on average 13 speakers. Co-
horts in the treatment group sent out 50 invites on average, 1% for events in year
4, 37% in year 5, and 62% for events in year 6. These averages are significantly
higher than in control schools as suggested by the P-values of the differences in
the last column. In the estimations, I account for these differences by adding the
number of invites as a possible control for the post-double LASSO to select from,
or controlling for them directly in the specification with ad hoc selected covariates.
Cohort level characteristics are presented in panel C. Treatment and control co-
2Since these events took place before the official roll out of the programme and they took place
more than two years prior to the test, I exclude them from the analysis.
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horts consist of 46 and 44 pupils respectively, and the average gender split is almost
identical across the two groups. In the control group, on average 8.23% of pupils
per school-cohort are eligible for free school meals compared to 8.84% of pupils
in treatment cohorts. The last column suggests that all three differences are in-
distinguishable from zero, whereas the population density in post code districts of
treatment cohorts is significantly higher than for control cohorts. I partially address
this issue by adding population density to the list of possible controls in the LASSO
or control for it directly in the specification with ad hoc selected covariates. Albeit,
this remains a reason for concern if this imbalance suggests that treatment is cor-
related with other unobservable confounders that cannot be controlled for with the
existing covariates.
1.6 Estimation & Methods
1.6.1 Estimation of Main Effects
I estimate four sets of specifications, one without controls, one with a set of ad hoc
selected covariates, one in which I control for the post-double selection covariates
from the LASSO, and in the last one I add school fixed effects to the post-double
LASSO controls. In all regressions, I control for prior attainment to get an estimate
of the treatment effect in terms of progress between year 2 and year 6 tests. For
each set of controls, I estimate the following set of equations for individual i in
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cohort c in school s and year t.
yicst = β0 + β1Tcst + φy˜icst + µXsct + γs + δt + εicst (1.3)
yicst = β0 + β1Tcst + β2Same Gendericst + φy˜icst + µXisct + γs + δt + εicst(1.4)
yicst = β0 + β1Tcst + β2Girl ∗ Femaleicst + β3Boy ∗Maleicst +
+φy˜icst + µXisct + γs + δt + εicst (1.5)
yicst = β0 + β1Girl ∗ Femaleicst + β2Boy ∗Maleicst + β3Girl ∗Maleicst +
+β4Boy ∗ Femaleicst + φy˜icst + µXisct + γs + δt + εicst (1.6)
The treatment indicator Tcst is defined at the cohort level and is equal to one if the
school-cohort that pupil i is part of attended a careers talk. I denote test scores
in year 2 exams in the outcome subject as y˜icst, δt are year fixed effects and γs
are school fixed effects. The vector of controls Xisct varies depending on whether I
estimate the effect with no controls, ad hoc selected controls, post-double LASSO
selected controls, or post-double LASSO selected controls plus school fixed effects.
In equation 1.3, I estimate the average treatment effect of a careers talk on all
pupils. In equation 1.4, I estimate the treatment effect for pupils whose gender
matches that of the majority of speakers in an event compared to pupils where the
gender does not match as the coefficient on Same Gendericst, whereas the coeffi-
cient on Ticst compares the outcome when the gender does not match compared to
the control group, and in equation 1.5 I further disentangle this effect by gender.
Lastly, in equation 1.6, I run the fully satiated model to compare in-gender and
out-gender matches for boys and girls to the control group.
In equation 1.4 - 1.6, the vector of covariates Xisct includes pupil gender. Across all
equations, the set of ad hoc selected covariates further includes cohort averages of
performance on year 2 tests in Maths and Reading and standard deviations thereof.
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Furthermore, cohort shares of pupils aged 10 - 11 who are eligible for free-school-
meals, the gender distribution of the cohort consisting of the mean and standard
deviation, and the population density at the school’s postcode. Lastly, the number
of volunteers a school invited for events targeted at year 5 and 6.
1.6.2 Post-double LASSO Regularisation
Due to the large number of potential covariates in my data, I use LASSO regulari-
sation to check the validity of my estimations without any and with ad hoc selected
controls. I use the post-double LASSO following Belloni et al. (2014), which selects
covariates in two steps distinguishing between “noise reducing” and “identifying”
controls. To reduce noise in the estimation, the post-double LASSO first selects
the combination of covariates that best predicts the outcome variable. Secondly, it
selects the regression model that best predicts the treatment variable. Under the
assumption that treatment is exogenous conditional on covariates, this step selects
those covariates that achieve identification of the causal effect.
Using the post-double LASSO, I select different sets of controls for Maths and Read-
ing test scores, and for the specification with and without school fixed effects. The
regularisation selects covariates from the set of ad hoc controls plus individual level
data on test scores in year 2 in Maths and Reading, and pupil gender. Furthermore,
the squares of all these variables and pairwise interactions, which leads to a total
of 135 possible covariates to select from. Of these, the post-double LASSO selects
up to 19 controls for year 6 Maths scores when I control for school fixed effects. A
full list of controls is provided in table A.1 of the appendix. The sets of LASSO
selected controls are different from the ad hoc selected ones, but, the noise reducing
covariates for the two outcome variables, year 6 scores in Maths and Reading, are
very similar, while the set of identifying controls is identical by design.
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1.7 Results
1.7.1 Main Effects
Table 1.3: Treatment effect Year 6 test scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Maths Year 6
Treatment -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09* -0.09 -0.07
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Same Gender Speaker 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 8295 8295 8299 8323 8295 8295 8299 8323
Panel B: Reading Year 6
Treatment -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Same Gender Speaker 0.05** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 8286 8286 8291 8314 8286 8286 8291 8314
Prior Attainment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Girl Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes
Post-Double LASSO Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ad hoc Yes Yes
Without Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the school*cohort level and reported in brackets below.
The indicator BL / Prior Attainment, at the bottom of the table, refers to covariates measuring
performance on year 2 tests, which are included in the regression to express treatment effects in
terms of progress between year 2 and year 6 tests. Test scores are standardised to a standard
deviation of one and mean zero in the control group by gender.
In table 1.3, I present the results from estimating equation 1.3 and 1.4. I estimate
each equation with post-double LASSO with and without school fixed effects, ad
hoc selected and without controls. In the top panel of the table, I show estimates
for regressions of the progress between year 2 and year 6 Maths tests on treatment
and in the bottom panel, I show the results for progress in Reading as the outcome
variable. The estimates in the first four columns indicate that the average treat-
ment effect of the intervention is negligible across all specifications on both outcome
variables. For Maths, the effect sizes range between -0.08 for LASSO without fixed
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effects and -0.04 for LASSO with fixed effects, whereas for Reading the effect sizes
range from -0.02 with LASSO and ad hoc selected covariates, to -0.04 standard
deviations without controls. Standard errors in parentheses below the estimates
suggest that the effect sizes are not significantly different across specifications.
In the second half of the table’s columns, I estimate heterogeneous treatment ef-
fects on pupils who attend a talk by a speaker of the same gender compared to
those with a speaker of the opposite gender, and to those in the control group. The
coefficients on the treatment indicator suggest that the progress of pupils in Maths
with an opposite gender speaker is 0.06 to 0.09 standard deviations smaller than in
the control group, while the estimates for pupils with a same gender speaker show a
positive and insignificant change in progress by 0.04 standard deviations compared
to those with an opposite gender speaker. In Reading, pupils with a same gender
speaker improve progress compared to those with an opposite gender speaker by
0.05 to 0.06 standard deviations, whereas pupils the treatment effect for pupils with
opposite gender speakers relative to the control group is imprecisely estimated at
-0.04 to -0.07 standard deviations. As above, the coefficients across specifications
in columns 5 - 8 on either outcome are not significantly different from each other.
In table 1.4, I show the results for the same gender treatment effect split by gender
in equation 1.5 and the fully satiated model by gender in equation 1.6. Estimations
of the first model indicate that girls with female speakers improve their progress in
Maths by 0.07 to 0.11 standard deviations compared to girls with male speakers,
and in Reading by 0.08 to 0.11 standard deviations. However, estimates of the sec-
ond model highlight that these effects are largely driven by negative effects of male
speakers on girls compared to girls in the control group. In Maths, the negative
effects for girls with male speakers range from -0.13 without to -0.15 with controls
and in Reading from -0.09 to -0.11 standard deviations, while the performance of
girls with female speakers in either subject does not change significantly compared
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to the control group. Boys with male speakers lose out to the control group by 0.11
to 0.12 standard deviations in Maths progress whereas the decrease in Reading test
scores is not significant.
Whilst the effect of treatment is not perfectly causally identified as discussed in
section 1.4, the fact that the estimates do not vary significantly between specifi-
cations implies that they are robust to including different sets of covariates. This
adds confidence to the assumption that the estimates identify a causal effect unless
they are biased by confounders that are orthogonal to the covariates in the model.
Since all estimates in this chapter bear this risk, any conclusions derived from the
results are subject to this concern.
The results indicate an interesting pattern of heterogeneity in the impact of the
intervention on progress between year 2 and year 6 tests. The average effect of
a careers event is negligible and indistinguishable from zero in both Maths and
Reading tests. These results stand in contrast to findings by Jensen (2010) who
documents positive effects on the number of years of schooling from correcting be-
liefs about returns to education through statistical information, and Nguyen (2008)
who finds a positive impact on performance, attendance and future enrolment.
However, the latter, who tests different ways of transmitting the novel information,
namely statistical information, a role model or both, finds too that the role model
intervention is less effective than providing statistical information. The fact that
the speakers in this intervention did not provide hard statistical facts on actual
returns to schooling but instead provided more general information on different ca-
reers, may be one explanation for why my findings differ from their main conclusion.
My estimates of heterogeneous effects by same and opposite gender match between
pupils and speakers show that an opposite gender match decreases girls’ progress in
Maths and Reading compared to the control group, whereas boys with male speakers
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Table 1.4: Treatment effect Year 6 test scores by gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Maths Year 6
Treatment -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Boy*Male Speaker -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.12** -0.10 -0.11* -0.10
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Girl*Female Speaker 0.07* 0.09 0.09 0.11* 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.02
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Boy*Female Speaker -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Girl*Male Speaker -0.15***-0.14** -0.15** -0.13
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Observations 8295 8295 8299 8323 8295 8295 8299 8323
Panel B: Reading Year 6
Treatment -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Boy*Male Speaker 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Girl*Female Speaker 0.08** 0.11** 0.11*** 0.10** 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Boy*Female Speaker -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Girl*Male Speaker -0.11** -0.09 -0.11* -0.11*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 8286 8286 8291 8314 8286 8286 8291 8314
Prior Attainment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Girl Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes
Post-Double LASSO Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ad hoc Yes Yes
Without Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the school*cohort level and are reported in brackets below.
The indicator BL / Prior Attainment, at the bottom of the table, refers to covariates measuring
performance on year 2 tests, which are included in the regression to express treatment effects in
terms of progress between year 2 and year 6 tests. Test scores are standardised to a standard
deviation of one and mean zero in the control group by gender.
only decrease progress in Maths but not in Reading. The fact that the effects on
the same pupils vary by subject suggests that they are driven by an interaction
effect between subject and speakers that not only prevents students from reaping
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the benefits of the careers talks but lead to deteriorating performance.
1.7.2 Interaction with Gender Norms
To study how the treatment effect varies by regional gender norms, I estimate
regressions of the form
yicst = β0 + β1Girl ∗ Femaleicst + β2Boy ∗Maleicst +
+β3Girl ∗Maleicst + β4Boy ∗ Femaleicst +
+β4Girl ∗Male ∗Women Rightsicst + β5Women Rightss +
+φy˜icst + µXisct + δt + εicst (1.7)
where Girl ∗Male ∗Women Rightsicst is an interaction between the opposite gen-
der effect on girls with regional data on gender norms, and Women Rightss is the
corresponding main effect. A positive sign on the interaction term implies that the
negative opposite gender effect on girls is stronger in regions with more traditional
gender norms and a negative sign implies that the effect is stronger in regions with
more progressive norms.
I use data on gender norms from the 2005 - 2009 wave of the World Values Survey
(Inglehart et al. (2014)) for the UK, which is the most recent survey wave with
data on the UK. I use two questions from the survey to measure gender norms,
one captures the attitude towards women in the labour market, and the second
one women’s rights more generally. The first question reads “When jobs are scarce,
men should have more right to a job than women” and the corresponding variable
Work Rights assumes a value of one if the respondent disagrees and is therefore
positively correlated with progressive gender norms.3 The question behind the sec-
ond variable, General Rights, asks “How essential of a characteristic of democracy
3The variable used in the regression is an average over all responses per region and therefore
non-binary.
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is it that women have the same rights as men” and is answered on a scale from one
to ten, where one refers to “not an essential characteristics of democracy” and ten
to “an essential characteristic of democracy”.
The smallest geographical unit in the data is the region level, which implies that
all schools from one region are assigned the same gender norms.4 Table 1.5 shows
the regional distribution of pupils and schools across the nine regions, and figure
1.1 illustrates the distribution of norms across regions with the number of pupils
that each bar represents indicated on top.
Table 1.5: Regional distribution by pupils and schools
Pupils Schools
# Pupils Share Cum # Schools Share Cum
East Midlands 421 4.66 4.66 6 5.94 5.94
East of England 923 10.22 14.88 12 11.88 17.82
Greater London 3577 39.60 54.48 31 30.69 48.51
North East 128 1.42 55.90 3 2.97 51.49
North West 1010 11.18 67.08 14 13.86 65.35
South East 882 9.77 76.85 10 9.90 75.25
South West 472 5.23 82.07 7 6.93 82.18
West Midlands 1078 11.94 94.01 11 10.89 93.07
Yorks & Humberside 541 5.99 100.00 7 6.93 100.00
Total 9032 100.00 101 100.00
Note: Regional split by number of pupils and schools based on school postcode.
In table 1.6, I present estimates for the interaction effects of the coefficients of
the satiated model with the two measures of gender norms. The estimates for
Maths scores imply that the negative effect of male speakers on both girls and
boys is amplified in regions with more traditional gender norms, as indicated by the
4Since the gender norm data is at the school level, this regression does not include school fixed
effects.
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Figure 1.1: Gernder norms by region
Note: Measures of gender norms are based on data from the 2005 survey
wave of the World Values Survey (Inglehart et al. (2014)). Both y-axes are
increasing in more progressive norms. The blue bars represent region averages
of question V44 (Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the
following statements? - When jobs are scarce, men should have more right
to a job than women.), where I obtain a binary measure by treating neither
agree nor disagree as missing values. The red bars represent region averages of
question V161 (Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential
characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things
how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale
where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10
means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy” - Women have
the same rights as men.), where I divide the averages by 10 to obtain a scale
from 0.1 to 1. On top of each bar, I indicate the relative size of the region as
measured by the number of students.
positive coefficient on the interaction withWork Rights. These results suggest that
the negative effect of male speakers on Maths progress of girls and boys is related
to the prevailing local gender norms, or other correlated regional factors like the
aptness of male speakers to motivate pupils for Maths related careers, potentially
driven by local labour market conditions. For Reading, the estimates point in the
same direction but are insignificant, as are the coefficients on the interactions of
Work Rights with boys and girls with female speakers. The interactions with the
other measure of gender norms, General Rights, are all insignificant.
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1.7.3 Quantile Regressions
Table 1.7: Quantile regressions of fully satiated model
Mean 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Panel A: Maths Year 6
Boy*Male Speaker -0.12** -0.02 -0.19***-0.16** -0.17***-0.14* -0.17** -0.10 -0.08 -0.11*
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Girl*Female Speaker 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.07 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Boy*Female Speaker -0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Girl*Male Speaker -0.15***-0.07 -0.25***-0.19** -0.18***-0.15** -0.16** -0.15** -0.08 -0.12**
(0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Observations 8295 8295 8295 8295 8295 8295 8295 8295 8295 8295
Panel B: Reading Year 6
Boy*Male Speaker -0.06 -0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.10 -0.12 -0.17** -0.14* -0.09 -0.06
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11)
Girl*Female Speaker 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.07
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Boy*Female Speaker -0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Girl*Male Speaker -0.11** 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.19***-0.20***-0.24***-0.20** -0.16* -0.09
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Observations 8286 8286 8286 8286 8286 8286 8286 8286 8286 8286
BL / Prior Attainment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Girl Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post-Double LASSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the school*cohort level and reported in brackets below. The indicator BL
/ Prior Attainment, at the bottom of the table, refers to covariates measuring performance on year 2 tests, which
are included in the regression to express treatment effects in terms of progress between year 2 and year 6 tests.
Test scores are standardised to a standard deviation of one and mean zero in the control group by gender.
Finally, in table 1.7, I present quantile regressions for the fully satiated model in
equation 1.6.
The estimates show that the effect of male speakers on boys in Maths is located in
the middle of the distribution, decreasing progress of boys in the second to sixth
decile by 0.14 to 0.19 standard deviations. For girls, the effects are even more spread
out and affect nearly all parts of the distribution except the first and eighth decile.
The effect sizes range from -0.12 standard deviation in the ninth decile to -0.25 in
the second, where this appears to represent a trend that the girls at the bottom
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of the distribution are most affected by the treatment. In Reading, the effect on
boys is concentrated around the sixth and seventh decile, and is highest in the sixth
decile with -0.17 standard deviations. For girls, the negative effects on Reading
scores are most prevalent in the top half of the distribution, ranging from -0.16 in
the ninth to -0.24 standard deviations in the sixth decile.
1.8 Discussion
1.8.1 Compatibility of Model and Empirical Results
The main hypothesis of the model suggests that careers talks increase pupils’ ef-
fort by providing information on higher utility job outcomes than those they are
already familiar with. The new information makes increased effort worthwhile as
it increases the probability of achieving a higher utility job. The empirical analysis
in this paper does not provide any evidence in favour of this channel, at least not
as the dominating mechanism. Compared to the control group, pupils with careers
talks perform the same on average or worse in the case of girls with male speakers
on both subjects and boys with male speakers in Maths.
The model illustrates two channels that may interfere with the positive effect of new
information. First, careers talk speakers might trigger additional stress in pupils
that leads to a depletion of resources and an increase in the cost of effort during the
subsequent test, which reduces performance. According to the stereotype threat
literature in social psychology, stress can be induced through priming on a negative
stereotype (Steele and Aronson (1995), Spencer et al. (1999)). Insofar as careers
talks by male speakers constitute a negative stereotype, this might be an explana-
tion for the negative effect on girls that is visible in the data.
The estimations in section 1.7.2, where I interact the negative effect of male speakers
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on test scores with regional data on gender norms, appear to support the hypothesis
that stereotype threat is at least partially responsible for explaining the negative
effect on girls. The estimates show that the negative effect on girls and boys is
stronger in regions with more traditional views on women’s role in the labour force.
However, since the data on gender norms is from 2005 - 2009, it may not accurately
capture current gender attitudes and the results should be interpreted with caution.
Furthermore, the analysis can also not rule out other correlated mechanisms, such
as regional variation in the quality of male speakers.
Since the effect on boys is also stronger in regions with more traditional norms,
stereotype threat triggered by male speakers is unlikely to be the only driver of
the effect. Lastly, since the stereotype threat literature documents the negative
effect from priming on a stereotype only for performance on tests that take place
immediately afterwards, the stereotype threat theory can explain the results only
if the girls were reminded in some way reminded of the negative associations with
the male speaker shortly before or during the test, which might arise if speakers
mentioned year 6 SATs during the talk.
Since the stereotype literature suggests that the effect targets test performance but
not long term effort, a way of testing for this channel would be to measure effort
of pupils after the talk, or to follow pupils over time and test whether the negative
effect wears out as would be expected if long term effort is not affected. I cannot
draw a final conclusion on this channel, as I do not observe effort or performance
on later tests in the data.
The model also suggests that the positive effect of novel information could be re-
versed if the pupils consider the speaker unattainable, which reduces the subjective
probability of achieving the higher utility outcome, and thereby the optimal level
of effort exerted by pupils. This mechanism might be partly responsible for the
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negative effect of male speakers. Whilst I do not observe measures of speakers’ pro-
fessional success to test for the interaction between the negative effect and distance
in achievement explicitly, the quantile regressions in table 1.7 offer some insights. If
lack of perceived attainability were the channel at play, the negative effect of male
speakers would be largest for pupils at the bottom of the performance distribution,
as their achievement is furthest away from that of high achieving speakers. How-
ever, the estimates do not perfectly match that prediction, instead they imply that
the effect is driven by boys in the second to sixth decile, and girls across almost
the entire distribution. Therefore, further research is necessary to examine this
relationship more closely.
1.8.2 Imbalance between Treatment and Control Group
Since the identification strategy in this study does not perfectly rule out endogene-
ity in the treatment allocation, a remaining concern is that the estimates are partly
influenced by selection or other omitted variable bias. As I discuss above, there is
scope for endogeneity in the treatment variable due to selection at the school-cohort
level. Any unobservable cohort level characteristics that make the cohort more or
less likely to host a careers event and that also affect performance of pupils will bias
the estimates. For instance, teacher quality that is different from the school average
might affect test scores and also increase the likelihood of being in the treatment
group if the teacher’s good practices include organising careers talks. Since I do
not observe these potential differences between treatment control group, I cannot
control for their influence in the estimations.
Moreover, table 1.2 shows that even though all schools in the sample have hosted
careers talks for some age group, schools in the control group have invited signifi-
cantly fewer speakers to give talks for year 5 and 6 during the sample period. I can
control for these observable confounders in the estimations, but the existing imbal-
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ances might be indicative of differences in unobservable characteristics that I cannot
control for. Lastly, treated school-cohorts are more often in more densely populated
postcode areas than untreated cohorts. As before, I can control for population den-
sity directly but not for any related unobservable factors such as infrastructure and
labour market opportunities.
Even though the setup in this paper does not lend itself to dealing with these re-
maining endogeneity concerns directly, the fact that the estimates are stable across
specifications with different sets of controls adds confidence to the assumption that
careers talks play a major role in driving the results and shows that the estimated
impact is robust to including these controls. Unless none of the sets of controls
included any omitted variables, and all the controls are uncorrelated with unob-
servable confounders, the stability of estimates suggests that there is no significant
scope for omitted variable bias in the estimations. However, due to the large num-
ber of potential unobservables at the speaker, cohort and individual level that arises
from the data limitations, I cannot conclude from this that I identify the causal ef-
fect of careers talks on pupils.
Furthermore, as far as any conclusions that are based on comparisons of the differ-
ential effects on Maths and Reading are concerned, selection bias is less likely to be
an issue unless it is correlated with subject specific performance of the cohort rather
than average performance across subjects. Yet, this might arise if the class teacher
who initiates the event is also better at teaching one subject than the other, and
therefore yields higher average test scores for their pupils. Alternatively, children
from more advantaged backgrounds for whom the careers talk represents less novel
information may do systematically better in one subject than the other.
Future research could address some of these issues with richer data on student and
cohort level characteristics and speaker quality. In the next chapter, I conduct an
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experiment in which treatment of a similar intervention is randomly allocated to
schools, and speaker quality is uniform, which rules out the endogeneity issues in
this discussion.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the impact of careers talks in primary schools on pupils’
performance on year 6 standardised tests. The careers talks are aimed at providing
pupils with information about a variety of careers to expand their knowledge about
career options beyond those that they observe in their social network. This infor-
mation is intended to raise the effort that pupils invest into education and thereby
foster social mobility through increased career choice.
I present a theoretical framework in which I model the effect of careers talks as a
higher utility job outcome in pupils’ utility function whose probability of materi-
alising increases with effort. Therefore, the new information makes it worthwhile
for pupils to invest more effort into education as this increases the probability of
achieving the higher utility job. I then extend this standard choice model by adding
two channels that can lead to changes in the optimal behaviour of pupils.
First, I allow for careers talks to induce additional stress and distraction that act
as an increase in the cost of effort during tests if the speakers evoke negative emo-
tions in pupils. Such distractions can be triggered through priming on a negative
stereotype regarding pupils’ ability, as suggested by the literature on stereotype
threat, which predicts that when negative stereotypes are made salient, pupils who
are subject to the stereotype will be distracted by the pressure not to fulfil the
stereotype.
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A second channel that can undo the positive effect of careers talks in the model
captures the negative effect on pupils when the high utility job outcome introduced
in the careers talk is perceived as too far from their own set of attainable options.
If the distance between the new reference point and pupils’ perceived ability is too
big, pupils discount their subjective probability of achieving it, which will lead to
lower optimal investment of effort into education. Overall, the model predicts that
pupils’ performance in year 6 tests will improve in response to careers talks, unless
one or both of the two negative channels dominate the main effect.
To study this relationship, I use data on careers talks in English primary schools
during the school years 2014/15 and 2015/16, and individual level data on perfor-
mance in year 6 tests following the event. Since treatment is at the cohort level,
I can exploit within and between school variation in treatment assignment to es-
timate the effect of careers talks on pupils. I use different sets of individual and
school level covariates to limit the scope for endogeneity in the estimations further.
While I find that the results are consistent across specifications, I cannot entirely
rule out threats to internal validity that arise from selection and omitted variables
bias.
The empirical results show no significant average treatment effect on progress be-
tween year 2 and year 6 tests in either Maths or Reading. Yet, I find a significant,
negative effect on Maths and Reading performance for girls with a male speaker
and on Maths scores of boys with male speakers. The estimations further suggest
that negative effect in Maths for both girls and boys intensifies in measures of more
traditional regional gender norms about men’s dominance in the labour market.
Both effects are also fairly equally spread out across the distribution as shown in
quantile regressions.
These findings imply that any positive effect from novel information on career op-
Chapter 1 41
tions is outweighed by other negative effects of careers talks. To a certain extent
is the effect on girls compatible with theoretical predictions regarding the effect of
stereotype threat, which reduces the performance of pupils who are primed on a
negative stereotype through the careers talks, for instance that women are less apt
for a successful career than men. The result that the negative effect on girls with
male speakers is larger in regions with more traditional gender norms would further
support this hypothesis. However, I cannot rule out that the observed effect is
driven by variation in regional speaker quality that is correlated with gender norms
rather than with norms directly. Furthermore, since the negative effect on boys’
performance also increases in regions with more traditional norms, and men are
less likely to represent a negative stereotype for boys, stereotype threat triggered
by male speakers is unlikely to be the sole driver of the effect.
The negative effects might also be driven by pupils to whom the male speakers
seem unattainable and who in response decrease their subjective probability of a
high job outcome, which reduces their optimal level of effort. According to the
theoretical predictions, this effect will be largest for low performing pupils, but the
quantile regressions substantiate this hypothesis only to some extent. Moreover,
since speakers vary depending on the location of the school, I cannot rule out that
this heterogeneity in effects is driven by differences in the quality of speakers that
are correlated with regional gender norms.
These findings suggest avenues for future research. First, the remaining scope for
endogeneity in the estimations implies that future research with richer data on in-
dividual level characteristics of the students including their family background and
parental attitudes regarding gender and education, as well as speaker quality is
needed to verify the results. This information would also allow for more insightful
analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects as gender attitudes would be more ac-
curately measured.
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Additional analyses are necessary to determine the longer term effects of careers
talks on course choice in secondary school and higher education as these outcomes
will allow the determination of how careers talks affect actual career choices. It
would be particularly interesting to examine career choices of pupils with reference
to parents’ careers to better gauge whether careers talks improve social mobility.
Studying long term effects would also allow further insights into the mechanisms at
play in this paper, as the negative effect on girls, if it is driven by stereotype threat,
should affect performance only temporarily and not long term effort and it should
thus wear off over time.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Role Models on
Aspirations and Educational
Achievement in UK Primary Schools
Abstract
The achievement gap of pupils from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds
in developed countries is large and persistent. In this paper, I focus on the
influence of low aspirations, arising due to a lack of exposure to role models,
in reducing the demand for education from low-income families. To study how
role models impact aspirations and in turn educational achievement, I run a
randomised controlled trial in the year 6 classes of 48 English primary schools.
I generate exogenous variation in the exposure of pupils to role models by de-
signing a video intervention with STEM professionals to take place in class,
and I analyse the role model channel explicitly by varying the gender of the
speaker in the video. I test the impact of the intervention on survey measures
of aspirations and performance on end-of-year tests in Maths and Reading.
The estimations show a positive effect of the treatment on aspirations and
educational achievement when speakers and pupils are of the same gender.
This highlights the importance of same gender role models for the effective
transmission of information, and shows that pupils in order to process the
information and channel it into productive effort need to be able to relate to
the speakers via gender.
JEL codes: C93, I24, I26, J16
Keywords: educational inequality, aspirations, role models, STEM
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2.1 Introduction
In 2017 in the UK, the achievement gap for pupils eligible for free-school-meals
relative to non-eligible pupils was 9.5 months at the end of primary school (Ed-
ucation Endowment Fund (2018)). In the OECD-EU1, the average gap in PISA
(Programme for International Student Assessment) Maths scores at age 15 was
20% in 2016 between pupils in the bottom and top quarter of an index of economic,
social and cultural status (OECD (2017)). The achievement gap by socioeconomic
background is associated with constraints to the supply of and the demand for qual-
ity education.
In this paper, I focus on the influence of low aspirations, arising from a lack of
exposure to role models, in reducing the demand for education from low-income
families. Exposure to role models in the family or social network is immediately
correlated with parents’ education and neighbourhood characteristics, and if ex-
posure to role models affects educational achievement and schooling choice, the
lack thereof might constitute a barrier to social mobility. Role models will matter
for performance if they affect aspirations, which are the achievement related goals
that pupils set for themselves as reference points, and aspirations in turn affect
educational achievement. If this relationship holds, then inequality in role models
reinforces educational inequality.
To study how role models impact aspirations and in turn educational achievement,
I ran a randomised controlled trial (RCT) in year 6 classes of 48 English primary
schools in the spring of 2017. I generate exogenous variation in the exposure of
pupils to role models, by designing a video intervention to take place in class rooms
of year 6 pupils, which is the final year of primary school. The video intervention
1Includes Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Re-
public, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
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consists of two parts: first, an animated video illustrating the way Maths is useful
in a number of careers ranging from graphic design to robotics engineering, and
secondly, a TED-like talk by a speaker with a background in STEM (Science, Tech-
nology, Engineering, Mathematics) as the potential role model. To disentangle the
effect of neutral transmission of information from a role model effect, the speaker
in the second part of the video varies by gender, which allows examination of how
the treatment effect intensifies when the genders of pupil and speaker match. The
second part of the video has six different versions, three versions feature male and
three feature female speakers of different ethnicities. I measure the effect of the
video, and the effect of a gender match between speaker and pupil, via survey mea-
sures of aspirations immediately after the intervention in March, and test scores in
nationally standardised tests (year 6 SATs) 1.5 to 2 months later in May 2017.
In order to measure the effect of the treatment, survey data was collected in two
rounds as detailed in figure 2.2. The baseline survey took place during December
2016 and January 2017, and the endline survey was collected in treatment schools
after the intervention in March 2017 and in control schools during the same time
without the preceding intervention. From the surveys, I obtain measures of stu-
dents’ educational, career and private life aspirations and their mindset towards
learning as an indicator of their Growth Mindset. The test score data to measure
the impact of the intervention on educational achievement is based on administra-
tive school data. I use progress between year 2 (age 6 -7) mandatory assessments
and year 6 SATs (age 10 -11) in English and Reading as the main outcome mea-
sure of educational achievement. SATs are nationally standardised tests in Maths,
Reading, Grammar, Punctuation and Spelling (GPS) and (non-standardised) Writ-
ing that all year 6 pupils take in their final year of primary school, and while they do
not serve as entry-exams into secondary school, they are an important monitoring
tool for the government to track school performance and are therefore taken very
seriously by teachers and pupils. This implies that performance on these tests is a
Chapter 2 47
meaningful outcome measure of educational achievement of pupils.
Identification in this paper relies on random allocation of schools into treatment and
control group. The unit of randomisation is at the school level, so that an entire
school is either randomly allocated to receive the treatment or to be part of the
control group. This design ensures that the SUTVA (stable unit treatment value
assumption) is satisfied as it rules out spillovers from treatment group to control.
No two pupils from the same school are allocated to different groups, and schools
are sufficiently far apart to ensure no spillovers between schools as well. Further-
more, no pupils switched schools between treatment assignment and intervention.
Balancing tests show that treatment and control groups are not significantly differ-
ent based on survey characteristics at baseline and prior attainment.
The survey and test score samples differ in their composition: survey data from
both rounds is available for forty schools, whilst test score data is available for
thirty schools. After the data collection at baseline and randomisation of 48 schools,
eight schools did not return the endline survey and are thus excluded from the final
survey data sample. However, this sample is still balanced at baseline. Moreover,
two of the schools that did not return the endline survey made test scores available
and are included in the test score sample. Twelve of the schools that returned both
surveys, did not report test scores, and in most cases, the non-reporting of data is
due to staff turnover during the school summer holidays. Since schools received the
test scores in July 2017, shortly before the holidays, many of them did not send
them to me until after the break, and in instances where the main contact or head
teacher left the school during this period, schools were reluctant to share the data.
Notwithstanding, the sample of thirty schools for which test score data is available
is balanced on prior attainment, and baseline survey data when available, which is
the case for all but two schools. Only the average ethnic composition of schools
is marginally significantly different between treatment and control groups in this
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sample and I will control for ethnicity in all regressions.
The analysis of gender differences in baseline survey measures and prior attainment
shows that boys have lower degree aspirations but aspire to a more difficult dream
job than girls and are more likely to embrace a Growth Mindset than girls. Boys
also have more male centric gender stereotypes regarding professional success. In-
terestingly, boys have higher aspirations for their performance in Maths tests even
though they have the same prior Maths attainment on average. In English, boys’
aspirations are lower than girls’, and so is prior attainment. These gender differ-
ences suggest that boys are overall more confident, especially in Maths, which might
partly explain the the stronger treatment effect on boys’ Maths scores.
Whilst the analysis does not provide evidence for a significant impact on pupils in
the treatment group on average, I find a positive effect of treatment on aspirations
and educational achievement when speakers and pupils are of the same gender.
Boys who watch a video with a male speaker have 0.19 standard deviations higher
progress between year 2 and year 6 performance on Maths tests, 0.7 standard devi-
ations higher degree aspirations and the self reported difficulty of their dream job is
1.14 standard deviations higher than of boys with female speakers, conditional on
baseline values. Girls with female speakers are 10% more likely to have a Growth
Mindset than those with male speakers, and boys and girls with same gender speak-
ers have higher aspirations for their performance on Maths tests than those with
opposite gender speakers.
The fact that treatment has an effect only if the speaker is of the same gender as the
pupil, highlights the importance of same gender role models for the effective trans-
mission of information. This shows that pupils in order to process the information
and channel it into productive effort need to be able to relate to the speakers via
gender.
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To compare how the same gender treatment effect differs between pupils with very
high achieving same gender peers and those whose highest achieving classmate’s
performance is average compared to all other top students, I interact the same gen-
der treatment with the test score of the highest achieving same gender peer in the
class. I find that the effects on test scores of girls with female speakers vary with the
performance of their female classmates as the treatment effect is smaller for girls
with very high achieving peers than for girls with less high achieving girls, which
suggests that female speakers and high achieving peers have substitutive effects on
performance. The treatment effect of boys does not vary by peer performance.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to provide experimental evi-
dence on the link between role models, aspirations and educational achievement in
primary school pupils. The survey data collected for this experiment before and
after the intervention shed light on the changes in non-cognitive skills such as aspi-
rations that accompany and potentially drive the effects on test scores. The design
allows to study the importance of relatability via gender for both boys and girls,
thereby adding to the existing evidence on the impact of female role models on
girls. The results illustrate that the findings for female role models do not carry
over straightforwardly to boys and the widening gender gap in achievement in favour
of girls highlight the importance of increasing boys’ engagement at school. As the
controlled video intervention ensures that the quality of speakers is uniform across
schools and regions, I can study these effects in isolation from any speaker specific
influences that might affect the results.
In Economics, the relevance of noncognitive skills, such as perseverance, motivation
and self-control, in addition to cognitive skills are recognised in work by Heckman
(2000) and Carneiro and Heckman (2003) as key to driving schooling and earnings
outcomes. These studies also emphasise that both cognitive and non-cognitive skills
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are malleable through family and the social environment especially at a young age.
See also Cunha and Heckman (2006) for a review of the literature on early child-
hood interventions.2
The concept of non-cognitive skills and aspirations in particular, as a cause and
consequence of socioeconomic inequality was introduced by Appadurai (2004) and
Ray (2006). The authors argue that individuals form preferences based on experi-
ences of other people in their cognitive neighbourhood, and they call these socially
dependent preferences aspirations. Subsequent papers by Genicot and Ray (2017)
make further theoretical contributions regarding the circular relationship between
socially determined aspirations, income and the income distribution. In Political
Economy, Besley (2016) offers a theoretical perspective on the role of socially deter-
mined aspirations in influencing income inequality through voting for redistribution
in a framework in which aspirations evolve endogenously.
The broader idea that individuals learn behaviour through observation of the people
in their surroundings, and that learning is more likely to happen if the model is per-
ceived as similar to themselves, goes back to the formulation of the Social Learning
Theory by social psychologist Bandura (1977, 1986). In experimental tests of the
theory, which I return to in section 2.2.1, he confirms the impact of role models in
the transmission of information and behaviours of children.
In Economics, most empirical studies combine the effect of role models with pro-
vision of targeted information to affect aspirations and behaviour. Bernard et al.
(2014) deploy a randomised video intervention in Ethiopia to show that success-
ful entrepreneurial role models increase farmers’ aspirations, savings behaviour and
investments into children’s education, and Batista and Seither (2018) find that in-
2Note that interventions at primary school age are not considered early childhood interventions
in this literature.
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creasing aspirations of micro-entrepreneurs in Mozambique in combination with goal
setting and business skills training increases profits by 40% relative to the control
group.
Focusing on the relationship between role models and educational outcomes, Dee
(2005) shows that teachers perceive students of their own gender and ethnicity
as being of higher ability than demographically different students, and that these
gender and ethnicity dynamics between teachers and pupils contribute to the de-
mographic attainment gaps in the US. Similarly, Lusher et al. (2018) find positive
effects on performance for Asian / Non-Asian undergrad Economics students who
are assigned to a TA of a similar ethnicity. Beaman et al. (2012) exploit a natural
experiment in India to show that female role models affect girls’ career aspirations
and educational attainment, and Breda et al. (2018) show that female STEM role
models raise the probability of French female high school students applying and
being admitted to selective Science programmes by 30%.
I add to this empirical literature by focusing on the effect of role models and aspi-
rations of primary age pupils before they make any irreversible education choices,
which implies that policy interventions could have long lasting impact on educa-
tional outcomes. Furthermore, the design in this study allows to estimate the effect
of same gender role models on boys and girls separately, while previous studies focus
primarily on female role models.
Using targeted information to influence behaviour, as this study does through video
screenings, is not a new concept and has been studied in a variety of contexts.3
Nguyen (2008), Jensen (2010), and Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014) show positive
effects of information on labour market returns and returns to education on edu-
3See the Public Health literature (Prochaska et al. (1993), Shiffman et al. (2000), Campbell
et al. (1994), Marcus et al. (1998)) for positive impacts of information on smoking cessation,
dieting and exercising
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cational attainment and test scores in Madagascar, the Dominican Republic and
Mexico. Furthermore, other schooling decisions such as college major choices are
also influenced by labour market information. Hastings et al. (2015) use data from
Chile to show that students have inaccurate beliefs about major specific earnings,
Baker et al. (2017) find that low-income, low-achieving students who apply to low-
earning degrees in California (USA) overestimate salaries by more than 100%, and
Reuben et al. (2017) document that girls have lower earnings expectations than
boys. All three studies find that novel labour market information affects college
major choice. A recent study by Lergetporer et al. (2018) analyses the impact of
providing information about the cost and returns to university on educational aspi-
rations of parents in Germany, and find that the information increases educational
aspirations of parents with and without university degree. However, since the ef-
fect is larger on parents with university degree, they conclude that the inequality
in information does not explain the socioeconomic gap in educational aspirations.
Related research on the role of popular media in social change documents that
behaviour change can also be achieved through indirect information through enter-
tainment television (La Ferrara et al. (2012), DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2015) and
La Ferrara (2016)).
A recent strand of the literature in Psychology extends this evidence on the impact
of targeted information by showing that simple and small, but well targeted inter-
ventions can have large and long lasting effects on participants in other domains
too. Walton (2014) provides an extensive overview of this literature. Two interven-
tions that are particularly relevant and underpin the intervention in this paper are
Hulleman and Harackiewicz (2009) on the Expectancy Value Theory and Blackwell
et al. (2007) on the Growth Mindset of Intelligence. In the treatment group in
Hulleman and Harackiewicz (2009), 9th graders, every 3 to 4 weeks, summarised
the relevance of their science coursework in their lives. In the control group, stu-
dents summarised the week’s science topics without reference to its usefulness. The
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intervention raised science grades amongst students in the treatment group who
expected to perform poorly.
Blackwell et al. (2007) follow up on earlier studies concerning the Growth Mindset
of Intelligence. In this study, the treatment group was formed of 8th grade students
who learned in eight class room workshops that “intelligence is malleable and can
grow like a muscle with hard work and help from others”. In contrast, pupils in the
control group learned about the relationship between brain regions and functions.
The authors find that students in the treatment group improve their Maths grades
whilst performance of those in the control group deteriorates.
My study builds on this evidence by designing a small and targeted intervention
that relies on the predictions of the Social Learning Theory and Expectancy Value
Theory to elicit the relationship between role models, aspirations and educational
achievement. The intervention provides targeted information to pupils in order to
change their study behaviour, and additionally allows to isolate the importance of
relatability between the recipient and transmitter of information in driving these
effects.
The next section provides a detailed description of the theories which underpin
the experimental design, of the context, and of the intervention itself. Section 2.3
discusses the data and sample characteristics. In section 2.4, I present the methods
and estimations, and in section 2.5 the main results. I discuss the implications of
this research and its limitations in secion 2.6. Finally, section 2.7 concludes and
provides guidance for further research.
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2.2 Experimental Setup
2.2.1 Theory
Two theories, borrowed from social psychology, underpin the design of the experi-
ment in this study. First, Wigfield and Eccles (2000) propose the Expectancy Value
Theory and design experiments to test the validity of the hypothesis to show that
achievement related choices depend on subjective task value and the expectation of
success. The former, subjective task value, refers to the usefulness of mastering
a given task, ie. how a task will help with one’s future plans. The latter, as the
name suggests, captures beliefs regarding one’s probability of success in a given
task. Taken together, the theory predicts that children’s motivation increases if
they believe that the task at hand will be useful in the future and that they have
a high probability of being successful. The authors arrive at these conclusions by
estimating a positive relationship between pupils’ expectation of success and their
performance in Maths, and between pupils’ subjective task value and their propen-
sity to continue taking Maths. They use longitudinal data on middle school pupils
in the US (Meece et al. (1990)) and replicate the findings with data on primary
school pupils (Wigfield et al. (1997)).
The second theory is the Social Learning Theory by Bandura (1977). Bandura hy-
pothesises that behaviour is learned through observation of other people and tests
this hypothesis in a series of experiments in the 1960s called the Bobo Doll Experi-
ments. The experiments feature two treatment groups and one control group with
6 year old boys and girls as participants. In the first treatment group, participants
watch an adult male or female model behaving aggressively towards a toy. In the
second treatment, the model plays quietly and non-aggressively. Participants in the
control group are not exposed to any model. The experiments show that children
who observe aggressive behaviour are far more likely to behave aggressively than
children in the second treatment or control group. The imitation effect of same
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gender models on boys is stronger than on girls. These results suggest that children
learn through observing and imitating behaviour of models and are more likely to
do so if they perceive the models as similar to themselves.
The video intervention in this study incorporates the predictions from both theories.
First, it provides information on the usefulness of Maths in a range of careers and
illustrates examples of people who overcame difficulties in acquiring their Maths
skills, thus aiming to enhance the expectations of success. Secondly, it creates
variation in the similarity between model and pupils via gender.
2.2.2 Context
The total sample in this study comprises 48 state-funded primary schools from
across England. I recruited schools in part through a charity’s network that also
provided contact to speakers in the videos and partly through direct contact with
schools and education trusts. The schools in the sample are randomly allocated
to treatment and control group, stratified by prior attainment, location (London /
non-London) and school size. The leading reason for randomising at the school level
rather than class or individual level is to avoid contamination of the control group.
In most schools, play time for all pupils of the same year is joint and randomisation
at the class level would not have allowed to control for the spillover of information
between pupils in the treatment and control group within the same school.
The intervention took place in all the year 6 classes of schools in the treatment
group in March and early April 2017 while year 6 classes in the control schools did
not receive any intervention. In treatment schools, pupils filled in endline surveys
within two days of the intervention, and pupils in the control group around the same
time of year. The main reason for the intervention taking place during primary
school is that pupils, at this stage in their education, will not have made any
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Figure 2.1: Education system in England
Source: UK Department for Education
irreversible specialisation choices that create past dependence in their achievement.
Throughout primary school, all pupils follow a fixed curriculum, and it is not until
secondary school that pupils make course choices for their end of secondary school
exams in year 10 and 11 at age 14 - 16. See figure 2.1 for a graphical illustration
of the English education system. Furthermore, year 6 as the final year of primary
school is well suited for this experiment to take place because all pupils sit end
of primary school tests in May of that year. Since the tests and assessments are
nationally standardised, pupils’ performance on them is comparable across schools.
Even though these tests do not have a direct impact on pupils’ educational future,
eg. they do not serve as entry exams into secondary school, they are an important
public indicator of schools’ performance. As such, teachers and consequently pupils
take them very seriously, which renders them a meaningful measure of educational
achievement.
2.2.3 Intervention
The intervention consists of an approximately 10-minute-long video, made specially
for this experiment. The video aims to provide information on the usefulness of
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Maths and presents a TED-like speaker as potential role model. In the first part,
the video illustrates the usefulness of Maths in a number of careers ranging from
graphic design to robotics engineering. An animated moderator guides the pupils
through an animated illustration of how graphic designers use Maths to scale comic
characters using snippets from famous animation movies. The video builds on this
by using the example of folding bicycles to document how bicycle engineers use
geometry to calculate the correct circumference of a tyre so that it fits well with the
other parts, or how robotics engineers use coordinate systems to navigate robots in
robotics football. All examples are tailored to the year 6 curriculum in Maths to
ensure that they cover material that is adequate for the age of pupils. This part
of the video iss designed to emphasise the subjective task value of studying Maths,
which, as predicted by the Expectancy Value Theory, influences motivation and
achievement in Maths.
The second part of the video builds on the Social Learning Theory to generate a
role model effect. This part of the video features a TED-like talk by a STEM pro-
fessional on their personal “Maths story”, how they use Maths in their professional
and private lives, and which areas of the subject they used to struggle with and how
they coped. This section has six different versions, each featuring one speaker of a
different gender and ethnicity. There are three male and three female speakers of
White British, South-Asian and African / Black Caribbean ethnicity. The purpose
of having six different versions is to create exogenous variations in the extent to
which pupils can relate to the speakers through gender and ethnicity. The analysis,
however, focuses exclusively on relatability via gender, since ethnicity is unbalanced
across treatment and control group in the test score data (refer to section 2.3 for
more details). Having both female and male speakers, not only allows to vary the
extent to which boys and girls relate to the speaker, but also to estimate the role
model effect for boys and girls separately. All speakers follow the same script but
give individual, genuine accounts of their experience. The occupations of speakers
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are balanced across gender – two bicycle engineers and one economist for each gen-
der – to ensure that the job related examples in the videos are also balanced. The
different versions of the video are randomised across treatment schools and all year
6 classes per school watch the same version of the video.
Figure 2.2: Experimental timeline
The timeline of the experiment is illustrated in figure 2.2. The baseline survey was
administered in all 48 participating schools during December 2016 and January
2017. Video screenings in all but three schools took place between 14 and 31 March
2017, the three remaining interventions took place during the week commencing
17 April – this delay was due to spring term break taking place during the first
two weeks of April. I collected endline survey data in all control schools during
this time, and in treatment schools shortly after their respective screening dates.
About two months after the intervention, between 8 and 12 May 2017, all year 6
pupils took SATs in Maths, Reading, Writing and GPS. The test scores that pupils
obtained in the Maths and Reading sections of SATs will serve as my main outcome
measures of achievement.
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Table 2.1: All schools vs. experimental sample (for 2015 cohort)
All Schools Sample
Obs Mean Obs Mean Diff(C-T) OLS P-val
Panel A: Test Scores
Maths Year 6 15162 70.83 47 70.06 0.7630 0.56
Reading Year 6 15159 31.21 47 30.33 0.8853 0.12
Maths Year 2 15612 15.33 47 15.25 0.0836 0.82
Reading Year 2 15612 15.37 47 15.16 0.2112 0.59
Writing Year 2 15612 14.03 47 14.02 0.0062 0.99
Panel B: School Characteristics
Number of pupils 15658 36.36 47 45.57 -9.2175 0.01
Girls 15658 0.48 47 0.47 0.0096 0.62
% FSM Eligible 15658 4.13 47 6.97 -2.8402 0.00
Population Density (per hectare) 15658 21.18 47 48.10 -26.9214 0.00
Note: Balancing tests based on school level data for the cohort graduating primary school
in 2015, with unclustered OLS P-values reported in the last column. % FSM Eligible refers
to an average across shares of free-school-meal eligible pupils at age 9, 10 and 11 per school.
Population Density (per hectare) is the average number of people per hectare resident in the
postcode district of the school.
2.3 Data Description & Sample Characteristics
2.3.1 Comparison of Experimental Sample to all English Pri-
mary Schools
To provide a better understanding of the sample in this study, I compare in table
2.1 the experimental sample to the universe of primary schools based on data on the
cohort that graduated primary school in 2015. One sample school is not included
in these statistics due to missing data, since the school recently converted to an
academy and changed its school identifier code.
As balance tests, I conduct a simple T-test and report P-values of the two-sided
test. The table shows that the sample is representative of all primary schools in
the country in terms of achievement in year 6 and year 2 tests. P-values on the
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differences in achievement are far larger than conventional significance levels, except
for year 6 Reading scores, which are (nearly significantly) worse in the experimental
sample. However, schools in the sample are significantly larger than the average
English primary school in terms of number of year 6 pupils, a larger share of pupils
in the sample are eligible for free school meals, which is a measure of deprivation,
and sample schools are located in more densely populated areas. These differences
are not surprising as large schools in deprived, inner-city districts are more likely
to be interested in raising their pupils’ aspirations and therefore to respond to the
invitation to join the project. Whilst these differences do not have any implications
for the internal validity of the results in this paper, they are important in assessing
their external validity. The findings may not translate to the average school with
fewer pupils in less densely populated and less deprived locations. However, this
is unlikely to be an issue if the intervention is only scaled up to schools that have
identified low aspirations of pupils as a binding constraint. Since the sample was
formed with an oversubscription design where all experimental schools opted into
the sample, the results are likely to hold for the relevant population of schools that
are interested in such an intervention.
2.3.2 Survey Data Sample
Description of Survey Data Sample
For the experimental sample, I have survey and test score data for two different sub-
samples: survey data is available for 40 schools, and test score data for 30 schools.
The main reason for attrition in the survey data sample is that schools failed to
return the surveys after pupils had filled them in. The time of the survey coincided
with the busiest period of the year with preparation for year 6 SATs. As a result,
despite close monitoring, surveys from eight schools are missing. Nonetheless, at-
trition is random as the reduced sample is still balanced on baseline characteristics.
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From the surveys, I obtain measures of aspirations in different domains. First, I
measure educational aspirations as the degree a pupil aspires to. The survey ques-
tion asks pupils how far they would like to go in school and possible answers range
from leaving school at 16 without a degree, leaving school at 16 with some quali-
fications, leaving after A-levels, taking A-levels and completing vocational training
to completing a university degree.
Secondly, the survey measures career aspirations by first asking pupils to list the
job they would like to get in the future, and subsequently to rank the difficulty of
getting that job on the Lickert scale. I interpret pupils who report a more difficult
dream job to have higher aspirations, as they set themselves higher goals. More-
over, pupils are asked to list the words that come to mind when they think about an
important exam. This question serves as an indicator for a Growth Mindset, which
is characterised by a child’s attitude to embrace mistakes as a learning opportunity
and places high value on resilience. I interpret fewer negative associations, such as
“scary” and “failure”, as leaning more towards a Growth Mindset.
The variable Grammar School Test refers to whether pupils have taken an entry
exam for a selective secondary school at the beginning of the school year, called
grammar school tests. This variable serves as a indicator of parental aspirations.
Children with parents who have higher educational aspirations are more likely to
apply to a selective secondary school than other children.4
The survey finally measures subject specific aspirations about the performance on
year 6 tests in Maths and English5. Pupils are familiar with being assessed in terms
of age-related achievement levels, which rate their performance either below, at, or
4Grammar schools are state-funded so this measure of aspirations is not directly linked to
parents’ income. However, grammar schools are not available in all areas of England and are
largely concentrated in the south-west and west of the country.
5English here jointly refers to tests on Reading, Writing and GPS.
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above the expected level. Correspondingly, the variables BL Maths Aspirations and
BL Engish Aspirations assume a value of one if a child aspires to perform below
expectations, two if at expectations and three if they aspire to performing above
the expected level.
The survey also elicits pupils’ attitudes regarding stereotypes about the professional
success of men versus women. The question asks which gender pupils think of when
thinking about someone who is successful in their job. The variable BL Job Gender
Stereotype assumes a value of zero if pupils in the baseline survey report to think
of a man, and one if they think of a woman or both mean and women. Pupils
also report the time they spend on homework as Actual Homework Time and the
amount of time they think they should best be spending on their homework as Best
Homework Time.
In addition to survey data on attitudes, I have administrative data on gender and
ethnicity of children. I create categories that reflect the three main ethnicities in En-
glish primary schools: White British, South-Asian and African / Black Caribbean.
All pupils of Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi and Nepalese ethnicities
are coded as South-Asian. As African / Black Caribbean, I classify all pupils of
Sub-Saharan, black Central and South American, and black Caribbean ethnicities.
Finally, all children of White British descent are classified as such. A fourth cat-
egory comprises all other ethnicities, including White European and any mixed
ethnicities.
Summary Statistics and Balance Tests of Survey Data Sample
As balance tests, I show mean differences across treatment and control group for
the two subsamples separately. In table 2.2, I show balance tests for the sample of
survey data. I present OLS and randomisation inference (see section 2.4.2 for an
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for survey data sample
Control Treatment P-value
Obs Mean Obs Mean Diff(C-T) OLS RI
Panel A: Aspirations
BL Degree Aspirations 676 4.07 588 4.01 0.0644 0.60 0.59
BL Difficulty Job 655 2.91 573 2.80 0.1108 0.29 0.33
BL Growth Mindset 689 0.68 600 0.68 0.0013 0.98 0.98
Grammar School Test 688 0.49 597 0.39 0.1027 0.31 0.32
BL Maths Aspirations 664 2.19 581 2.21 -0.0187 0.61 0.73
BL English Aspirations 669 2.08 583 2.09 -0.0070 0.84 0.92
Panel B: Other Attitudes
BL Job Gender Stereotype 656 0.59 587 0.58 0.0010 0.98 0.98
BL Act. Homework Time 676 33.95 591 31.88 2.0763 0.65 0.66
BL Best Homework Time 675 40.14 591 36.25 3.8832 0.41 0.42
Panel C: Ethnicity
White-British Ethnicity 689 0.69 600 0.48 0.2125
Black Ethnicity 689 0.06 600 0.14 -0.0838
South-Asian Ethnicity 689 0.04 600 0.10 -0.0587 0.00a***0.23a
Panel D: School Characteristics
# Pupils 21 42.05 19 52.74 -10.6892 0.24 0.23
Girls 21 0.50 19 0.47 0.0264 0.45 0.45
% FSM Eligible 21 6.02 19 7.33 -1.3175 0.31 0.30
Pop. Density (per hectare) 21 40.34 19 64.45 -24.1145 0.14 0.14
Note: Balancing tests based on pupil level data. OLS P-values are clustered at the school
level and reported in the penultimate column, and randomisation-t P-values from 2,000 draws
are reported in the last column. % FSM Eligible refers to an average across shares of free-
school-meal eligible pupils at age 9, 10 and 11 per school. Population Density (per hectare) is
the average number of people per hectare resident in the postcode district of the school. The
acronym BL in panel A and B stands for “baseline”.
a: Since ethnicity shares within a cluster are not independently distributed, the F-statistics of
the joint significance tests are reported.
introduction to the method) P-values from regressions of the form
yi = α + βTi + εi (2.1)
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where y is the outcome and T is one if the school is in the treatment group and
zero otherwise.
The outcomes in panel A - C are based on pupil level data and OLS standard errors
are clustered at the school level. In panel C, I report F-values for the joint signifi-
cance of all three ethnicity shares in the last two columns as these shares of pupils
in a school are inter-dependent.6 The data in panel D are at the school level and
since this is the unit of treatment, standard errors are not clustered.
The table shows that the sample contains survey data for 21 control schools and 19
treatment schools. Pupils in treatment and control schools have very similar degree
aspirations with the average child aspiring to doing A-levels and completing voca-
tional training. Career aspirations measured as the difficulty of their dream job are
slightly higher in the control group by about 3%. The Growth Mindset measure is
almost identical in both groups and highlights that 68% of children do not express
negative associations with important exams. Pupils in the control group are ten
percentage points more likely to have taken a grammar school test than treatment
pupils. Aspirations about performance on year 6 Maths and English tests are sim-
ilar across treatment and control group. On average, pupils aspire to performing
slightly above the age related expected level, and aspirations are marginally higher
for Maths than for English.
Gender stereotypes about professional success are balanced across treatment and
control group. The means show that a little under 60% of children think of women
or both men and women when they think of someone with a successful career.
Pupils in both groups report similar time spent on homework, 34 minutes in the
control group and 32 minutes in the treatment group. When asked how much time
6For instance, a large share of South-Asian pupils implies a relatively lower share of White-
British and Black pupils by construction. I present the F-value from a regression of the form
Ti = α+ β1White-Britishi + β2Blacki + β3South-Asiani + εi
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pupils think they should spend on their homework, both groups report more time
than they actually spend. Pupils in control groups consider 40 minutes the best
homework time, in the treatment group it is 36 minutes on average.
The ethnic composition varies between treatment and control group. While 70% of
pupils in the control group are White-British, less than 50% of the treatment group
are. This implies, that the shares of pupils of Black and South-Asian ethnicities
vary too. While 14% and 10% of pupils in the treatment group are of Black and
South-Asian ethnicity, respectively, only 6% and 4% of the control group are. To
account for the interdependence of these differences, I test the joint significance of
all three indicators in predicting treatment and report the corresponding F-values
in the two last columns.
In panel D, I present descriptive statistics of some school level characteristics. The
average year 6 cohort in treatment schools comprises 52 pupils, ten more than in
control schools. Half of all pupils in control schools are girls, the share in treatment
schools is just below at 47%. The share of pupils who are eligible for free-school-
meals is one percentage point higher at 7% in treatment schools compared to the
control group. Furthermore, the average treatment school is located in a postcode
district with slightly higher population density (64.45 per hectare) than the control
group (40.34 per hectare).
The penultimate column of the table shows that based on OLS P-values the sample
is balanced on variables at baseline, except ethnicity. With randomisation inference
(RI) P-values, the differences in means for all baseline variables are indistinguish-
able from zero at all conventional levels of significance. Notwithstanding, due to the
small sample size standard errors are large and some of the differences in means are
substantial despite not being significantly different from zero. I deal with the imbal-
ance in ethnicity by controlling for the three ethnicity indicators in all regressions.
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Since none of the other imbalances are significant, controlling for them would not
change the estimates. However, to the extent that these imbalances suggest other,
unobservable differences between the two groups, they remain an issue that I cannot
correct for in my estimations.
2.3.3 Test Score Data Sample
Description of Test Score Data Sample
I have administrative school records on test scores for a subsample of 30 schools,
15 in the treatment and 15 in the control group. As in the survey data sample,
the primary reason for attrition is staff turnover. After year 6 SATs were taken
in May and schools received the published results at the beginning of July 2017,
schools shared these with me. Since schools did not receive the published results
until shortly before summer break, most schools only shared them with me in the
beginning of the new school year. Eighteen schools from the original sample of 48,
or twelve from the sample for which survey data is available, opted out of the study
during this time since the main contact had left the school over the break.7
For the analysis of the effect on test scores, I measure performance on year 6 SATs
in Maths and Reading as scaled point scores that range from 80 to 120, where
100 refers to achievement at the expected age-related standard. To measure prior
attainment, I use pupils’ test scores from mandatory tests taken in Reading, Writing
and Maths in year 2 at the age of 6 - 7. These scores range from 1 to 9, where
1 refers to achievement below the expected level in year 1 and 9 refers to above
expected level in year 3. In the regression analysis in section 2.5.1, I standardise
test scores to mean zero and standard deviation of one in the control group by
gender, thereby also accounting for any gender differences in the dispersion of test
scores. In this study, test scores in Maths and Reading serve as the main outcome
7Two schools that failed to report survey data did share test score data.
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measure of educational achievement.
Summary Statistics and Balance Tests of Test Score Data Sample
In table 2.3, I show summary statistics and balance tests for the test score data sam-
ple. To test for balance, I estimate the regression in equation 2.1, and for ethnicity,
I test the joint significance of all three indicators as discussed above (see footnote 6).
Prior attainment, measured as test scores in year 2 exams8 on Maths, Reading and
Writing, is very balanced across the two groups. A mean Maths score of 5.41 in the
control group implies that pupils performed at the expected level in year 2. Pupils
in control schools performed, on average, slightly better in Maths, and worse in
Reading and Writing. Measures of aspirations and other attitudes are also similar
across groups. The F-values on the difference in ethnic compositions across the two
groups is significant with clustered OLS standard errors and with RI. As I discuss
above, I account for this imbalance, by controlling for ethnicity in all regressions.
2.3.4 Differences by Gender at Baseline
In addition to balance tests, I present differences in attitudes and test scores by
gender at baseline. I estimate these differences with a regression of the form
yi = α + βBoyi + εi
where yi are attitudes at baseline or performance on year 2 tests and Boyi is an
indicator equal to one if a pupil is a boy. Standard errors are clustered at the
school level. The estimates in table 2.4 show differences by gender in standardised
test scores in year 2 tests in Maths, Reading and Writing, and survey measures of
aspirations and other attitudes at baseline.
8For ease of interpretation, I present here non-standardised test scores
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics for test score data sample
Control Treatment P-value
Obs Mean Obs Mean Diff(C-T) OLS RI
Panel A: Test scores
Maths Year 2 586 5.41 575 5.37 0.0373 0.87 0.89
Reading Year 2 581 5.46 535 5.49 -0.030 0.90 0.91
Writing Year 2 577 4.89 535 4.98 -0.090 0.71 0.75
Panel B: Aspirations
BL Degree Aspirations 329 4.14 423 4.17 -0.0382 0.80 0.79
BL Difficulty Job 323 2.96 412 2.88 0.0804 0.54 0.60
BL Growth Mindset 586 0.83 579 0.77 0.0556 0.36 0.39
Grammar School Test 374 0.42 370 0.39 0.0360 0.78 0.79
BL Maths Aspirations 325 2.25 423 2.24 0.0074 0.87 0.89
BL English Aspirations 328 2.15 425 2.16 -0.0137 0.75 0.84
Panel C: Other Attitudes
BL Job Gender Stereotype 323 0.62 424 0.59 0.0265 0.58 0.59
BL Act. Homework Time 331 39.45 429 36.25 3.2034 0.69 0.72
BL Best Homework Time 332 44.24 427 42.85 1.3947 0.86 0.88
Panel D: Ethnicity
White-British Ethnicity 586 0.70 579 0.42 0.2782
Black Ethnicity 586 0.08 579 0.17 -0.0873
South-Asian Ethnicity 586 0.15 579 0.20 -0.0501 0.00a***0.10a*
Panel E: School Characteristics
# Pupils 15 47.13 15 49.13 -2.0000 0.85 0.84
Girls 15 0.53 15 0.47 0.0612 0.21 0.20
% FSM Eligible 14 5.88 15 6.47 -0.5857 0.69 0.70
Pop. Density (per hectare) 15 41.86 15 66.75 -24.8933 0.22 0.21
Note: Balancing tests based on pupil level data. OLS P-values of the differences in means
are clustered at the school level and reported in the penultimate column, and randomisation-t
P-values from 2,000 draws are reported in the last column. % FSM Eligible refers to an aver-
age across shares of free-school-meal eligible pupils at age 9, 10 and 11 per school. Population
Density (per hectare) is the average number of people per hectare resident in the postcode dis-
trict of the school. The acronym BL in panel B and C stands for “baseline”.
a: Since ethnicity shares within a cluster are not independently distributed, the F-statistics of
the joint significance tests are reported.
Panel A shows that girls perform significantly better than boys on year 2 tests in
Reading and Writing by about 0.6 to 0.7 points on a scale from 0 to 9, and in-
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significantly so in Maths. Panel B shows that girls, on average, aspire to education
beyond A levels, that means either university or vocational training, whilst boys
prefer not to continue after A-levels. In contrast, boys rate the difficulty of their
dream job significantly higher by 4% (point estimate of the difference is 0.11) com-
pared to girls, and they are 7% more likely to embrace a Growth Mindset, while
the probability of having taken a grammar school test is not significantly different
between boys and girls. On average, girls aspire to a Maths performance of 2.1 out
of three, where two is the expected level and three is above expectations, and an
English performance of 2.15, whereas boys’ aspirations for Maths are significantly
higher by 10.5% and for English lower by 5%. This is interesting and stands in
contrast with the gender differences in subject specific aspirations, which indicate
that boys have higher Maths aspirations than girls despite lower or equal prior at-
tainment.
Panel C presents differences in terms of other attitudes such as gender stereotypes
about career success, where roughly three quarters of girls think that women are
at least as or more successful than men, whereas boys majoritively consider men
more successful. The differences by gender in actual and best homework time are
not significant.
2.4 Estimation & Methods
2.4.1 Estimation of Main Effect
In what follows, I estimate the effects of two treatments: (i) the effect from being
in the treatment group, ie. watching the video with some speaker, regardless of
whether the gender of speaker and pupil match, and (ii) the effect on children who
watch a video with a speaker who is of the same gender as themselves. In the
regressions, I standardise all multinomial survey measures and test scores to mean
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Table 2.4: Gender differences in prior achievement and baseline survey measures
Girls Boys
Obs Mean Obs Mean Diff(G-B) OLS P-val
Panel A: Test Scores
Year 2 Maths 552 5.43 596 5.37 0.0549 0.46
Year 2 Reading 531 5.77 573 5.21 0.5681 0.00***
Year 2 Writing 530 5.30 569 4.61 0.6918 0.00***
Panel B: Aspirations
BL Degree Aspirations 753 4.24 743 3.92 0.3211 0.00***
BL Diffic. Job 724 2.80 730 2.92 -0.1126 0.09*
BL Growth Mindset 1068 0.74 1097 0.82 -0.0715 0.00***
Grammar School Test 811 0.45 842 0.47 -0.0252 0.52
BL Maths Aspirations 735 2.10 739 2.31 -0.2160 0.00***
BL English Aspirations 746 2.15 738 2.05 0.0987 0.02**
Panel C: Other Attitudes
BL Job Gender Stereotype 734 0.75 735 0.42 0.3344 0.00***
BL Act. Homework Time 753 37.08 746 33.76 3.3196 0.13
BL Best Homework Time 751 41.38 746 40.55 0.8246 0.71
Note: OLS P-values of the differences in means are clustered at the school level and
reported in the last column. The acronym BL in panel B and C stands for “baseline”.
zero and a standard deviation of one in the control group by gender to make the
coefficients more meaningful to interpret.
Simple ATE
To estimate the simple ATE, I regress the outcome variable on a treatment indicator
and optionally add individual level controls.
yi = β0 + β1Ti + φy˜i + µXi + εi (2.2)
The treatment indicator Ti in equation 2.2 is equal to one if pupil i is in a treatment
school so that β1 estimates the effect from being treated. To interpret the estimated
coefficients as measures of progress, I control for baseline values of the outcome
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variable, or achievement in year 2 tests where the outcome variables are test scores,
as y˜i. The vector of individual level controls Xi includes ethnicity indicators in all
regressions.
Same Gender ATE
The estimation of the Same Gender treatment effect follows analogously. The main
coefficient of interest in equation 2.3 is β2, and Same Genderi is a dummy variable
indicating that speaker and pupil are of the same gender.
yi = β0 + β1Ti + β2Same Genderi + φy˜i + µXi + εi (2.3)
I interpret the coefficient on the Same Gender dummy as the effect from watching
a video with a speaker who is of the same gender. The counterfactual are pupils of
that same gender who watched a video with a speaker of the opposite gender. The
coefficient on treatment assignment, β1, is an estimate of the effect from watching
an opposite gender speaker compared to being in the control group.
To disentangle the effects on girls watching a female speaker and boys watching a
male speaker, I also estimate equation 2.4. In this specification, I allow for the same
gender treatment effect to vary between girls and boys.
yi = β0 + β1Ti + β2Girl ∗ Femalei + β3Boy ∗Malei + φy˜i + µXi + εi (2.4)
where the interaction Girl ∗ Femalei turns one for girls with a female speaker and
Boy ∗Malei for boys with a male speaker.
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Lastly, I estimate the fully satiated model of the form
yi = β0 + β1Girl ∗ Femalei + β2Boy ∗Malei +
+β3Girl ∗Malei + β4Boy ∗ Femalei + φy˜i + µXi + εi (2.5)
2.4.2 Randomisation Inference
In addition to conventional clustered standard errors, I also estimate all equations
using RI to calculate the standard errors. The small sample in this analysis, and
in particular the small number of clusters, can lead to downward bias in conven-
tional clustered standard errors. Young (2017) shows that this issue is particularly
salient in estimations where the dependent variable is continuous and the treatment
variable is an interaction with covariates. In this study, test score estimations in
equation 2.3 - 2.5 satisfy both criteria. Following Rosenbaum (2002), RI exploits
the merits of randomisation to construct a test for which the distribution is known
and that is resilient to outliers. This allows estimation of standard errors that are
exact and thus unbiased even in a small sample. In RI, treatment allocation Ti is
considered the only stochastic element in the estimation and so, the outcome vari-
able is a deterministic function of treatment allocation. This allows to calculate a
vector β of coefficients for any potential random allocation of Ti. The P-values used
in this study reflect the null hypothesis that the β vector obtained in the experi-
ment is extreme enough compared to all other realisations of β based on random
allocations of schools to treatment.
Intuitively, it helps to think of RI as creating n = {1, ..., N} different placebo treat-
ment vectors and regressing the outcome on each of these. In each draw n, a placebo
treatment vector is created that randomly assigns schools to placebo treatment and
control groups to subsequently estimate the coefficients based on this placebo treat-
ment assignment. This procedure is repeated for each draw and finally yields a set
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of N estimated coefficients. RI uses the distribution of the N estimated placebo
treatment effects to compare the estimate obtained in the experiment. For instance,
based on the distribution of these coefficients, one rejects the null hypothesis of no
effect at 5% significance if the estimated coefficient obtained in the experiment lies
inside the 2.5th percentile of either tail of the distribution of placebo coefficients.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Main Effects
In table 2.5 to 2.8, I show estimates of the models in equation 2.2 to 2.5 for all
outcomes, and present clustered OLS P-values in round brackets and RI P-values
in squared brackets below the coefficients.
Treatment Effects on Test scores
The simple average treatment effect from watching the video, regardless of the gen-
der match between pupils and speakers, on both progress between year 2 and year
6 tests in Maths and Reading is close to zero, negative and insignificant.
When I compare the treatment effects of pupils with matching gender speakers and
non-matching speakers, as shown in the second column for each outcome variable,
the differences in treatment effects on performance are insignificant, but the esti-
mate on Maths progress for pupils with a same gender speaker becomes positive
whilst that on Reading scores is negative regardless of the gender match. The third
column splits the same gender effect by boys and girls and shows that boys with
male speakers perform significantly better in Maths by 0.19 standard deviations
than those with female speakers, while for girls, the gender match does not lead to
a change in performance. For the Reading outcome, the effects point in the same
direction but are insignificant. Estimation of the fully satiated model in the fourth
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Table 2.5: Treatment effect on test scores
Maths Year 6 Reading Year 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
(0.60) (0.41) (0.44) (0.60) (0.66) (0.68)
[0.65] [0.45] [0.49] [0.63] [0.70] [0.72]
Same Gender Speaker 0.07 -0.04
(0.28) (0.62)
[0.29] [0.64]
Girl*Female Speaker -0.05 -0.16 -0.11 -0.17
(0.70) (0.36) (0.27) (0.25)
[0.73] [0.43] [0.33] [0.32]
Boy*Male Speaker 0.19 0.12 0.03 -0.01
(0.08)* (0.31) (0.83) (0.95)
[0.14] [0.40] [0.85] [0.96]
Girl*Male Speaker -0.14 -0.07
(0.29) (0.56)
[0.39] [0.62]
Boy*Female Speaker -0.04 -0.03
(0.78) (0.85)
[0.82] [0.85]
BL / Prior Attainment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Boy Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1140 1140 1140 1140 1093 1093 1093 1093
# clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Note: OLS P-values are clustered at the school level and reported in round brackets below the
coefficients, and randomisation-t P-values from 2,000 draws are reported in squared brackets.
The indicator BL / Prior Attainment, at the bottom of the table, refers to covariates mea-
suring performance on year 2 tests, which are included in the regression to express treatment
effects in terms of progress between year 2 and year 6 tests. Test scores are standardised to
a standard deviation of one and mean zero in the control group.
column illustrates that the treatment effects by gender match on progress in com-
parison to the control group are qualitatively similar to those within the treatment
group by gender match, but insignificant.
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Treatment Effects on Aspirations
Similar to the estimates of the effect on test performance, the simple treatment
effects on measures of aspirations in table 2.6 and 2.7 are small, negative and in-
significant. In particular, the effect from watching a video with a speaker of any
gender does not affect average degree aspirations, the reported difficulty of the
pupil’s dream job, the Growth Mindset or subject specific aspirations for Maths of
English.
The comparison of treatment effects by gender match within the treatment group
highlights that a same gender speaker makes pupils aspire to a significantly more
difficult dream jobs by 0.56 standard deviations, the probability of embracing a
Growth Mindset increases by 6%, and aspirations for performance on year 6 Maths
tests by 0.23 standard deviations. The difference in the effects on Maths and En-
glish aspirations, and also on test scores as discussed above, suggests that the Maths
specific information in the video play a role in driving these effects.
Disentangling the effect by pupil gender shows that for boys with male speakers,
degree aspirations increase by 0.68 standard deviations and the difficulty of their
dream job by 1.14 compared to those with a female speaker, and girls with a female
speaker are 2% more likely to embrace a Growth Mindset than those with a male
speaker, whilst the same gender effects on subject specific aspirations seem to be
driven by both boys and girls. Noteworthy here is also the negative, and in the case
of English, borderline significant effect of male speakers on girls’ test aspirations.
The positive effect on the difficulty of boys’ dream jobs with male speakers remains
significant when comparing them to boys in the control group (0.88 standard de-
viations), whereas for other outcomes the comparisons to the control group are
insignificant. In fact, the satiated model reveals that some of the positive coeffi-
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Table 2.7: Treatment effect on subject specific aspirations
Maths Aspirations English Aspirations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment -0.07 -0.17 -0.17 -0.06 -0.11 -0.11
(0.71) (0.32) (0.32) (0.68) (0.53) (0.53)
[0.73] [0.37] [0.37] [0.70] [0.56] [0.56]
Same Gender Speaker 0.23 0.12
(0.02)** (0.60)
[0.03]** [0.60]
Girl*Female Speaker 0.35 0.14 0.02 -0.16
(0.14) (0.52) (0.92) (0.43)
[0.17] [0.56] [0.92] [0.46]
Boy*Male Speaker 0.14 0.01 0.20 0.16
(0.41) (0.98) (0.54) (0.57)
[0.50] [0.98] [0.53] [0.60]
Girl*Male Speaker -0.29 -0.31
(0.17) (0.11)
[0.21] [0.14]
Boy*Female Speaker -0.04 0.15
(0.89) (0.61)
[0.90] [0.65]
BL / Prior Attainment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Boy Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1216 1216 1216 1216 1225 1225 1225 1225
# clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Note: OLS P-values are clustered at the school level and reported in round brackets below the
coefficients, and randomisation-t P-values from 2,000 draws are reported in squared brackets.
The indicator BL / Prior Attainment, at the bottom of the table, refers to covariates mea-
suring the outcome variable in the baseline survey, which are included in the regression to
express treatment effects in terms of change between baseline and endline survey. Test scores
are standardised to a standard deviation of one and mean zero in the control group.
cients on the same gender treatment variables in the second and third column of
each variable appear to be a result of the combination of a positive same gender
effect and a negative effect of the opposite gender treatment. This seems to be the
case for the positive effect on Maths test scores and degree aspirations for boys and
on Growth Mindset for girls, where the opposite gender treatment has a negative
sign for each. Nonetheless, even compared to the control group, boys with male
speakers have higher Maths test scores and degree aspirations and girls with with
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female speakers are more likely to have a Growth Mindset, both however insignifi-
cantly so.
Overall, the estimations document that watching a video with a speaker of the same
gender leads to positive changes in Maths performance and all measures of aspira-
tions, except aspirations for performance on English tests. This implies that pupils
process the information in the video a positively or more effectively when they can
relate to the speaker via gender. This suggests that the effects may be driven by
a role model channel. Notwithstanding, the comparison of positive and significant
effects on Maths versus insignificant effects on Reading outcomes emphasises that
not only the transmitter of information but also the informational content itself
plays a role in improving aspirations and performance.
For Maths test performance, degree aspirations, and the difficulty of the dream job,
the positive same gender effect is stronger for boys than for girls, whilst the effect
on Maths aspirations appears to be driven by both girls and boys. This suggests
that the role model intervention is more effective in changing the aspirations and
performance of boys than girls.
Treatment Effects on other Attitudes
The treatment does not have a significant effect on gender stereotypes about pro-
fessional success. Whilst the signs of the coefficients in column 3 and 4 seem to
suggest that girls with female speakers favour women and boys with male speakers
favour men, the coefficients are not significant at conventional levels.
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The estimated treatment effects on the time pupils report to spend on homework
(Actual Homework Time), are all insignificant. Interestingly, the time a pupil thinks
they should spend on homework (Best Homework Time) decreases by 8.77 minutes
on average conditional on baseline measures, and the findings show that this effect
is driven primarily by girls with male speakers who report 15.77 minutes less than
girls in the control group. On average, pupils with an opposite gender speaker think
they should spend 11.25 minutes less on their homework than the control group.
The comparison with the insignificant effects on actual homework time suggest that
this change in attitudes does not translate into actual behaviour.
2.5.2 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity by Peer Performance
To examine how the same gender treatment effect varies with peer performance,
I interact the same gender coefficient with the performance of the top performing
student by gender per class. In table 2.9, I show estimates for the heterogeneity by
peer performance for girls and boys following regressions of the form
yi = β0 + β1Girl ∗ Femalei + β2Boy ∗Malei +
+β3Girl ∗Malei + β4Boy ∗ Femalei +
+β5Girl ∗ Female ∗High Performingi +
+β6Boy ∗Male ∗High Performingi +
+β7High Performingi + µXi + εi (2.6)
where High Performingi refers to the test score of the highest performing girl in
pupil i’s class if i is female and the highest performing boy if i is male. The estimate
for β5 indicates the difference in the same gender treatment effect on girls whose
highest performing female peer has a test score that is higher than the average test
score of top performing girls across all classes in the sample, conditional on prior
attainment. The estimate for β1 is the same gender treatment effect of girls whose
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Table 2.9: Interaction of treatment effect on test scores with peer performance
Maths Year 6 Reading Year 6
(1) (2)
Girl*Female Speaker 0.38 0.21
(0.03)** (0.26)
[0.12] [0.42]
Boy*Male Speaker 0.20 0.01
(0.25) (0.95)
[0.37] [0.96]
Girl*Male Speaker -0.15 -0.06
(0.26) (0.64)
[0.33] [0.69]
Boy*Female Speaker -0.07 -0.04
(0.63) (0.77)
[0.70] [0.82]
Girl*Female Speaker*High Perf. -0.32 -0.25
(0.00)*** (0.00)***
[0.03]** [0.03]**
Boy*Male Speaker*High Perf. -0.12 -0.02
(0.33) (0.81)
[0.12] [0.47]
BL / Prior Attainment Yes Yes
Ethnicity FE Yes Yes
Boy Dummy Yes Yes
High performing Yes Yes
Observations 1012 967
# clusters 30 30
Note: OLS P-values are clustered at the school level and reported in
round brackets below the coefficients, and randomisation-t P-values
from 2,000 draws are reported in squared brackets. The indicator BL
/ Prior Attainment, at the bottom of the table, refers to covariates
measuring performance on year 2 tests, which are included in the re-
gression to express treatment effects in terms of progress between year
2 and year 6 tests. The variable High performing captures test scores
on year 6 tests of the highest performing girl (boy) in the class of girl
(boy) i. Test scores are standardised to a standard deviation of one
and mean zero in the control group.
highest performing female peer is in the bottom half of all top performing girls in
the sample. Analogously, β6 is the change in test scores due to the same gender
treatment on boys with top performing male peers compared to boys with average
performing male peers.
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Interestingly, the negative estimates of β5 indicate that girls with top high per-
forming peers gain less from the same gender effect than girls with average high
performing peers, and the positive estimate for β1 that girls with low high per-
forming female peers gain more than those with average high performing peers.
This implies that girls’ response to the same gender treatment varies significantly
depending on the quality of their peers. Girls with very high achieving peers ben-
efit less from female speakers than girls with less high achieving classmates, which
suggests a substitutability between very high achieving classmates and the same
gender treatment. For girls who are used to seeing other girls in their class achieve
very high test scores, the successful female speaker in the video might represent less
of a novelty than for girls whose classmates are not amongst the top performers.
For boys, there is no evidence for such heterogeneity in treatment effects by peer
performance.
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 Alternative Interventions
The findings in this paper are, to some extent, certainly specific to the type of in-
tervention and they may vary for other interventions involving role models to raise
aspirations. Therefore, hereafter I briefly discuss alternative interventions and how
the treatment in this paper fits in.
The ideal setting to study the impact of role models would be one that allows to
compare aspirations and educational achievement of pupils with endogenously cho-
sen role models with whom they maintain a close and long-standing relationship,
like family and friends, to pupils without such role models. However, this is nat-
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urally impossible to reconstruct in an experimental setting as these relationships
form endogenously, which makes it impossible to isolate the impact of the role model
from other correlated influences.
One approach to translating this setting into a controlled experiment, would be
to introduce all pupils in the treatment group to a number of potential mentors
and have each pupil choose one to whom they can relate, and compare outcomes
of the treatment pupils to a control group without mentors. To identify the ef-
fect of relatability between pupils and mentors, half of the treatment group could
be allocated a random mentor instead of the one they chose to be most relatable.
Furthermore, each mentor would have to have mentees in each treatment group to
ensure that there are no systematic imbalances in mentor quality between the two
groups. Mentors would work with individual mentees during multiple sessions to
provide information on the usefulness of Maths and raise their aspirations by show-
casing that someone like themselves is capable of Maths and a career in a related
field.
The intervention in this paper is an approximation of this hypothetical ideal setting
within the boundaries of feasible options. Rather than allowing each pupil to choose
a relatable speaker, which would have been too time consuming for both pupils and
speakers in this project, I approximate variation in relatability between speakers
and pupils via the gender match and assume that on average pupils with a speaker
of matching gender are more likely to consider them a role model than those with an
opposite gender speaker. Moreover, to ensure that the average quality of speakers
is balanced between those who have a matching gender speaker and those who do
not, the intervention takes place via a uniform video. There are also three speakers
of each gender to reduce the likelihood that one gender is systematically of higher
quality than the other.
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Many organisations are running mentorship programmes and other studies have
used these settings to study the impact of one-off interventions on educational
outcomes (eg. Breda et al. (2018) in France). In future work, researchers could
collaborate with organisations to design a longer lasting intervention according to
the above criteria to study the impact of intensive mentorship from role models
compared to more short lived interventions.
2.6.2 Compatibility of Results with Previous Chapter
In this section I briefly discuss the compatibility of the results in this paper with the
previous chapter. In both chapters, I find an insignificant average effect of treatment
on pupils. Since the sample size in the first chapter is larger than in the second, this
result suggests that the insignificant effect in this chapter does not arise from to
imprecise inference due to the small sample size, but rather that positive and nega-
tive effects on sub-groups of students cancel each other out on average. Albeit, this
conclusion rests on the assumption that the insignificant effect in the first chapter is
not driven by bias due to selection into treatment, which I cannot perfectly rule out.
The positive same gender effects on boys that I find in this chapter stand in contrast
with the negative effects in the previous one, where these also vary significantly with
regional views on women’s role in the labour market. The heterogeneity by regional
gender norms could be driven by pupils who perceive the career talks differently
depending on the local norms, or by variation in the quality of speakers that is
correlated with views on women’s role in the labour market. In this paper, the ran-
dom allocation of video interventions to schools allows to rule out such a correlation
between local norms and speaker quality, and the results show no evidence for a
negative effect on boys. In fact, table A.1 in Appendix A shows that treatment
effects do not vary with local gender norms, or if anything the variation points in
the opposite direction as in the previous chapter. This may imply that the nega-
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tive effects on boys with male speakers in the previous chapter are driven by poor
quality speakers in regions with traditional gender norms.
The negative effects on girls in the previous chapter are largely consistent with the
findings in this paper, even though most of the effects are insignificant here. In
comparison with the control group, girls with male speakers lose out in all outcome
measures, and significantly so in the time they consider optimal to spend on home-
work (Best Homework Time). The findings in the previous chapter may suggest
that the insignificance of most effects in this paper is due to the small sample size
that makes precise inference more challenging.
2.7 Conclusion
The aim of this study is to analyse the relationship between role models, aspirations
and educational achievement of pupils. The achievement gap between advantaged
and disadvantaged pupils is substantial and persistent over time. This paper dis-
cusses the influence of role models and aspirations in explaining this gap. I argue
that since pupils’ exposure to role models is positively correlated with their social
neighbourhood, and if role models affect aspirations and educational achievement,
a lack of role models harms social mobility.
As economists we are interested in the efficient use of resources to optimise output.
We also care about efficient allocation for reasons of equality: equality of opportu-
nity requires for all members of society to have the same chances of success inde-
pendent of their socioeconomic background. While efficiency and equity pursuits
usually pose a trade-off, educational institutions that are designed so that all pupils
are best able to achieve their full potential, improve upon both efficiency and equity.
This implies compensating for both constraints to the supply of education, such as
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school quality, and the demand for education. This paper shows that demand for
education is influenced by pupils’ aspirations. Aspirations are determined by pupils’
social surroundings, which themselves also directly affect demand for education, eg.
parents’ education and neighbourhood characteristics. Therefore, understanding
the influence of role models on aspirations has important implications for education
policy as it can create a virtuous circle that leads to more role models for future
generations. For instance, reducing the achievement gap by socioeconomic back-
ground in education and the labour market, implies a more equal distribution of
role models, which may result in a self-sustained reduction of educational inequality
and a more efficient use of resources.
I investigate the impact of role models on aspirations and educational achievement
of primary school pupils with a randomised controlled trial. I find evidence for a pos-
itive impact of role models on aspirations and educational achievement. Whilst the
video intervention in this RCT has no significant effect on pupils in the treatment
group on average, it has a positive effect on pupils who watch a speaker of their own
gender. Boys, in response to watching a video of a male speaker, increase Maths
achievement by 0.19 standard deviations, while the effect on girls is insignificant.
Boys with male speakers have higher degree aspirations by 0.7 standard deviations,
and the difficulty of their dream job increases by 1.14 standard deviations, and girls
with female speakers are 10% more likely to have a Growth Mindset than those with
opposite gender speakers. Pupils with same gender speakers on average have higher
Maths aspirations by 0.23 standard deviations. Estimates of the treatment effects
on other attitudes are mostly insignificant, but girls with male speakers reduce the
homework time they consider optimal by 16 minutes.
These results emphasise the importance of the gender match for the intervention
to be effective, which suggests that pupils are more likely to internalise informa-
tion from people who they perceive as similar to themselves. This is in line with
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predictions of the Social Learning Theory by Bandura (1977), which shows that
behaviour is learned through observation and imitation of relatable models.
I explore how the effects on test scores vary with performance of same gender class-
mates and find that girls with very high achieving female peers benefit less from
the same gender treatment than girls with less high achieving female classmates.
The same interaction effect is not significant for boys and their same gender peers.
This suggests that girls’ performance is more strongly affected by same gender peer
performance than boys’, and that high achieving female classmates might act as
substitutes for adult female role models.
The findings in this study open up avenues for further enquiry. Since inference in
this analysis suffers from low power, follow-up research should rerun the experi-
ment with current primary school pupils and pool the data to increase the sample
size. This would allow to estimate the effects more precisely and and increase their
value in informing policy. With ethnicity data available at baseline, the new ex-
periment could stratify on this information to correct for the imbalances in the
current sample, which would allow to study the heterogeneity in treatment effects
due to ethnicity match between speakers and pupils. Moreover, since the balancing
tests show insignificant, yet substantive, differences between treatment and control
group, increasing the sample could also help with correcting these imbalances and
confirming that the estimates in this study are unbiased.
Furthermore, to provide evidence on the long term impacts of raising pupils’ as-
pirations on their educational attainment, future research should track long term
progress and course choice of pupils involved in this and any follow-up experiments.
Since the intervention in this study is small, it is conceivable that the positive ef-
fects on attitudes and test performance two months after treatment wear off over
time, and more research into this area is needed to formulate meaningful policy
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recommendations. A better understanding of the role of parents and pupils’ wider
social network in influencing the long term evolution of the treatment effects should
be crucial in this context.
Lastly, to further develop the research agenda on aspirations, methodological progress
to develop a uniform measure of aspirations is necessary, to obtain a more compre-
hensive view on how aspirations interact with indicators of socioeconomic back-
ground, and demographics such as gender and ethnicity more globally. The lit-
erature documents positive effects of aspirations but all studies rely on their own
measure and interpretation of aspirations. To derive relevant conclusions for the
external validity from the findings in this and other studies, a more unified approach
towards measuring aspirations is essential.
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Table A.1: Interaction of treatment effect on test scores with regional gender norms
Maths Year 6 Reading Year 6
(1) (2)
Girl*Female Speaker 3.19 2.01
(0.07)* (0.21)
[0.15] [0.30]
Boy*Male Speaker 0.17 1.91
(0.87) (0.36)
[0.90 [0.47]
Girl*Male Speaker 0.17 -0.81
(0.91) (0.60)
[0.93] [0.67]
Boy*Female Speaker 1.03 1.12
(0.48) (0.49)
[0.62] [0.58]
Girl*Female Speaker*Work Rights -4.84 -3.11
(0.05)* (0.14)
[0.16] [0.88]
Boy*Male Speaker*Work Rights -0.14 -2.85
(0.92) (0.31)
[0.88] [0.10]*
Girl*Male Speaker*Work Rights -0.52 0.95
(0.80) (0.64)
[0.99] [0.97]
Boy*Female Speaker*Work Rights -1.58 -1.65
(0.41) (0.45)
[0.55] [0.32]
BL / Prior Attainment Yes Yes
Ethnicity FE Yes Yes
Boy Dummy Yes Yes
Work Rights Yes Yes
Observations 1139 1092
# clusters 30 30
Note: OLS P-values are clustered at the school level and reported
in round brackets below the coefficients, and randomisation-t P-values
from 2,000 draws are reported in squared brackets. The indicator
BL/Prior Attainment, at the bottom of the table, refers to covariates
measuring performance on year 2 tests, which are included in the re-
gression to express treatment effects in terms of progress between year 2
and year 6 tests. Test scores are standardised to a standard deviation of
one and mean zero in the control group. Work Rights refers to a binary
variable based on question V44 in the 2005 survey wave of the World
Values Survey (Inglehart et al. (2014)) (Do you agree, disagree or nei-
ther agree nor disagree with the following statements? - When jobs are
scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.), where I ob-
tain a binary measure by treating neither agree nor disagree as missing
values. However, the estimations are not sensitive to this interpretation.
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Figure B.2: Endline questionnaire
Note: Endline survey for the treatment group. The version of
the control group is identical but misses question 49.
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Figure B.3: Video part I
Note: Snippets from part one of the intervention video.
Figure B.4: Video part II
Note: The six speakers that each appear in part two of one of
the six versions of the video.

Chapter 3
The Interplay of Risk Heterogeneity
and Risk Sharing
Abstract
Subsistence farmers, without meaningful opportunities to save, rely heavily on
steady agricultural yields for food consumption and income. Since formal in-
surance products are largely unavailable to smallholder farmers, informal risk
sharing arrangements with other farmers are often the only means to com-
pensate for shocks and to smooth consumption. Risk sharing arrangements
allow households to pool part of their income to insure each other against
adverse shocks, but gains from insurance crucially depend on the composition
of the risk sharing group. In this paper, I focus on the role of households’
risk profiles in determining the benefits from risk sharing. I develop a model
in which the costs and benefits from risk sharing are summarised in the risk
premium that a utility maximising agent is willing to pay to join the group.
The model yields two testable implications: Risk sharing partners will have
similar idiosyncratic shock variances, and idiosyncratic shocks of risk sharing
partners will have negative covariance. To test these theoretical implications,
I use data on the insurance network of a rural Tanzanian village consisting of
119 households. The empirical analysis confirms the theoretical implications
that risk sharing partners will have similar shock variances and the idiosyn-
cratic shocks have negative covariance. However, when testing for the joint
correlation of the similarity in shock variances and their covariance, the cor-
relation with shock variances remains significant, while the coefficient on the
covariance of shocks is imprecisely estimated.
JEL codes: I3, O12, O17
Keywords: risk sharing, development, agriculture
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3.1 Introduction
Subsistence farmers, without meaningful opportunities to save, rely heavily on
steady agricultural yields for food consumption and income. However, without irri-
gation, agricultural production is subject to large variation due to changing weather
conditions. Since formal insurance products are largely unavailable to smallholder
farmers, informal risk sharing arrangements with other farmers are often the only
means to compensate for shocks and to smooth consumption. Risk sharing ar-
rangements work by allowing households to pool part of their income to insure each
other against adverse shocks, but gains from insurance for risk sharing households
crucially depend on the composition of the group. Therefore, to study the benefits
arising from informal insurance it is important to define an optimal allocation of
risk sharing partners in equilibrium, and then to test empirically whether insurance
groups form according to these guidelines.
Risk sharing groups only persist if both households involved benefit from the agree-
ment. The gains from insurance, in this paper, are defined based on households’
idiosyncratic shock variances and the covariances of shocks between households.
Intuitively, a household will want to share risk with another household if they are
less risky or at most as risky as themselves. This arises since a household’s own risk
decreases through risk pooling if their risk sharing partner is less risky. Further-
more, insurance partners’ idiosyncratic risks must be insurable by the arrangement,
ie. they must not experience the same type of shock simultaneously. If two risk
sharing households were to experience negative shocks at the same time, the risk
pooling agreement would be of no use in smoothing consumption. In this paper, I
formally derive the equilibrium allocation of risk sharing partners in terms of shock
variances and covariances to capture both effects. I then conduct an empirical anal-
ysis of insurance links in a rural Tanzanian village to find that these indeed conform
to the theoretical implications.
Chapter 3 96
In the theoretical part of the analysis, I develop a model in which the costs and ben-
efits from risk sharing are summarised in the risk premium that a utility maximising
agent is willing to pay to join the group. The framework builds on Jaramillo et al.
(2015) by relaxing the assumption of independently distributed idiosyncratic shocks
to account for correlations between shocks that are likely to arise due to shared en-
vironmental conditions between farming households in a small village. Accordingly,
the model shows that, in equilibrium, the risk premium increases in the shock vari-
ances and in the covariances of shocks of the two households. Households will choose
to be in risk sharing groups for which the risk premium is smaller or equal to that
of the single state where a household does not share risk. This yields two testable
implications: Risk sharing partners will have similar idiosyncratic shock variances,
and idiosyncratic shocks of risk sharing partners will have negative covariance.
To test these theoretical implications, I use data on the insurance network of a ru-
ral Tanzanian village consisting of 119 households. Exploring all possible bilateral,
undirectional connections between households, this yields a dyadic data set of 7021
dyads in which each observation describes the relationship between two households
in the village. Using information on the income sources of each household member,
I construct proxies of the shock variance of a household and the covariance of shocks
between any two households in the data. Based on the rationale that the shock vari-
ance of a household captures their level of riskiness, which is inversely related to the
level of diversification of a household’s income, I use the number of income sources
per household member to approximate shock variances in the analysis. Similarly, I
compute the covariance of two households’ idiosyncratic shocks as the covariance of
their income profiles weighted by the number of household members active in each
income category. In the analysis, I regress a binary variable indicating whether
two households share risk on the difference in the number of income categories and
the covariance separately and jointly, controlling for dyad level characteristics like
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kinship and geographical distance.
The empirical analysis confirms the theoretical implications that risk sharing part-
ners will have similar shock variances and the idiosyncratic shocks have negative
covariance. In particular, the probability of two households being risk sharing part-
ners is positively and significantly correlated with the similarity of, or negatively
with the difference in, the number of income sources per household member. This
correlation is robust to controlling for measures of wealth like land owning of both
households and dyad level characteristics. This suggests that the correlation is not
driven by the fact that wealthier households are more attractive and are therefore
more likely to share risk which each other. Furthermore, I find that the probabil-
ity of risk sharing is significantly negatively correlated with a covariance of greater
than zero between idiosyncratic shocks. However, when testing for the joint corre-
lation of the similarity in shock variances and their covariance, the coefficient on
the covariance remains negative but loses significance, while the coefficient on the
similarity of shock variances remains significant and barely changes in magnitude. I
do not find evidence that this is driven by a lack of supply of potential risk sharing
partners whose shocks have negative covariance.
The main contributions of this paper are to develop a model of the endogenous
formation of risk sharing groups that allows for non-zero covariances between id-
iosyncratic shocks, and to test whether the equilibrium implications of the model
hold empirically. In the theoretical analysis, I extend the model by Jaramillo et al.
(2015) in two ways, first, by allowing for non-zero covariances between idiosyncratic
shocks, and by assuming a network structure that arises from multiple, possibly
overlapping, bilateral risk sharing groups per agent. By allowing for non-zero co-
variance between shocks, I am able to account for any interdependence of shocks
due to a similar living and working environment. Contributions by Fafchamps and
Lund (2003) and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) discuss this hypothesis but this
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study is the first to formalise it and test the theoretical implications empirically.
This work fits into the literature on the endogenous formation of informal insur-
ance networks. After early contributions by sociologists (amongst others J. Clyde
Mitchell (ed.) (1969), and Raub and Weesie (1990)), seminal papers by economists
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000) marked the starting point
of theoretical research on strategic network formation. The former present a the-
oretical analysis of the stability and efficiency of networks when these are formed
endogenously. The latter paper models the decision to form networks as a trade-off
between costs and benefits derived from the resulting links and consequently from
any indirect links. However, these analyses do not focus on the peculiarities of in-
formal insurance networks.
To fill this gap, Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) study specifically the formation of
informal insurance networks. By exploring the effect of cross-community links on
the shape and efficiency of risk sharing, they show that the existing empirical evi-
dence for inefficient risk sharing at the village level, which I return to in the next
paragraph, might be due to ignoring these inter-village arrangements. Finally, the
model by Jaramillo et al. (2015) is an important building block for this analysis as
they explore the effect of risk heterogeneity on the efficiency of risk pooling. They
find that Nash bargaining leads to sorting into networks with low risk heterogeneity
among members. I extend their model by relaxing the assumption that idiosyncratic
shocks are independently distributed which offers theoretical insights into sorting
along the dimension of covariances between idiosyncratic shocks.
In the absence of detailed information on network structures, early empirical studies
assumed insurance networks to be exogenous, for instance Townsend (1994) used
villages, and Grimard (1997) cultural identifiers such as ethnicity or caste, to proxy
for social networks. The former finds that idiosyncratic shocks explain little of the
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variation in household consumption and suggests that this is achieved through mu-
tual insurance in the village, and Grimard (1997) also finds similar evidence for
households linked through ethnic ties.
Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), Udry and Conley
(2004), and De Weerdt and Dercon (2002) use micro data on reported links between
individuals to obtain a more accurate mapping of networks. The first paper uses
data on informal insurance networks from the Philippines to examine co-movements
between individual shocks and transfers that network members send or receive. The
authors find strong evidence for a causal relationship between individual shocks, and
gifts and loans, and further that risk sharing takes place within networks of friends
and family rather than at the village level. Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) use the
same data to study how individual characteristics affect the probability of a link
and find strong evidence that geographical and social proximity, age and wealth are
important predictors of network links, but not negative correlations in occupations
and income, which they measure as farming versus non-farming. Notwithstand-
ing, this paper presents some evidence that a negative covariance between income
categories within farming is correlated with risk sharing. Furthermore, Fafchamps
and Gubert (2007) contribute methodologically by developing a covariance formula
that allows to calculate standard errors that account for autocorrelation in the error
terms of dyads that contain the same household, a method that I use to calculate
standard errors in the empirical analysis of this paper.
Udry and Conley (2004) map networks among farmers in Ghana to find that the
probability of a link is higher for individuals who reside within short geographical
distance and follow the same matrilineage. Finally, De Weerdt and Dercon (2002),
using the same data that I use, find consistent results with Udry and Conley (2004)
that kinship, geographical proximity, cultural background and wealth increase prob-
abilities for network links among individuals. This paper builds on this literature by
Chapter 3 100
explicitly relating risk sharing to the shock variances and covariances of households.
Finally, three papers are to be noted that discuss insurance mechanisms in the
context of poverty alleviation and development of the least developed. Dercon and
Christiaensen (2011) and Karlan et al. (2014) emphasise the importance of lifting in-
surance constraints in order to foster technology adoption and business investments.
The former find that a higher propensity to experience low harvests impedes tech-
nology adoption and dampens agricultural risk taking. The authors highlight that
insurance arrangements can increase the propensity to innovate by reducing risk
due to income volatility. Karlan et al. (2014) focus specifically on the distinction
between cash and insurance constraints in restraining investment in agricultural
production and they find that constraints to risk insurance pose the greater obsta-
cle on investment than the pure lack of financial liquidity. These results emphasise
the relevance of research on risk insuring mechanisms in order to derive policies
aimed at promoting rural and agricultural development of the poorest. Batista and
Vicente (2018) study the introduction of mobile money in Mozambique and find
that offering insurance through mobile money decreases investments in agricultural
production and likely leads to occupational change. As this effect appears to be
driven by credit constraints, it is in line with the theoretical predictions in Karlan
et al. (2014), but it illustrates that insurance can have adverse effects.
I proceed by presenting the theoretical framework in section 3.2 and deriving testable
implications in section 3.2.2. A detailed description of the network data from Tan-
zania follows in section 3.3, and I illustrate the estimation and methods in section
3.4. The empirical findings are presented in section 3.5 and discussed in section 3.6.
Section 3.7 concludes by summarising the main findings and suggesting avenues for
future research.
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3.2 Theoretical Framework
The framework in this paper is an extension of the model by Jaramillo et al. (2015),
which models the role of idiosyncratic shock variances in the optimal formation of
risk sharing agreements under the assumption that covariances between idiosyn-
cratic shocks are zero. In a variant of this model, I relax this assumption and define
the optimal risk sharing rule when idiosyncratic shocks are not independent.
3.2.1 Utility from Risk Sharing
Agents form bilateral risk sharing agreements in order to reduce the effect of adverse
shocks on utility via consumption.1 Following Jaramillo et al. (2015), agent i in
risk sharing group j solves a CARA expected utility maximisation problem with
exponential utility.
max
{cij(εj)}
Uij = −E
[
1
α
exp {−αcij(εj)}
]
The parameter α is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Consumption is de-
noted as cij and is a function of the realisation of shocks εj, and the state of nature
in group j is defined as εjt ≡ (v, ei, e−i). The common income shock that the group
faces is v ∼ (0, σ2v), the idiosyncratic income shock of agent i is ei ∼ (0, σ2ei), and
e−i ∼ (0, σ2e−i) is the income shock of the risk sharing partner, where σ2 denotes the
variance. Both idiosyncratic shocks are normally distributed.
Consumption in any given realisation immediately depends on the risk sharing rule
between partners. I assume an equal sharing rule that is exogenously given by
cj = κi +
ei + e−i
2
+ v (3.1)
Jaramillo et al. (2015) show that this risk sharing rule can be obtained through
1I discuss one possible matching mechanism in section A of the appendix.
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Nash bargaining.2 The fixed portion of income that an agent allocates to the risk
sharing group is κi. Regardless of the number of risk sharing groups that agent i
forms, the portion of income κi is fixed for all agents. To ensure that an agent can
meet all their liability at any time, κi needs to be small enough such that κi < 1pi ,
where pi is the number of risk sharing agreements.3 The expected indirect utility
from sharing risk in group j under the insurance rule in equation 3.1 is given by
Vij = −E
[
1
α
e−α(κ+
ei+e−i
2
+v)
]
(3.2)
To express the resulting risk from this insurance agreement in monetary terms, I
rewrite it as the risk premium that the utility maximising agent is willing to pay
to enter the agreement. The premium attaches a price to the risk of an agreement,
and the higher the risk premium of a risk sharing group, the higher the associated
risk. Arrow (1963) and Pratt (1964) define the risk premium of group j as
Πj =
1
2
ασ2εj
where σ2εj is the variance of the shocks in the insurance rule. Since I assume CARA
utility and normally distributed shocks, the Arrow-Pratt formula for the risk pre-
mium applies without approximation error and the indirect utility from sharing risk
in j becomes
Vi,j = − 1
α
e
α
[
−κ+α
2
(
1
4
∑
j={i,−i} σ
2
ej
+ 1
2
Cov(ei,e−i)+σ2v
)]
(3.3)
= − 1
α
eα(−κ+Πj) (3.4)
The risk premium increases in the variances of idiosyncratic shocks of both risk
sharing partners, in the variance of the common shock, and in the covariance be-
tween the two idiosyncratic shocks.
2The solution is conditional on (i) commitment in the allocation of resources once a group has
been formed, and (ii) pareto optimal allocation of resources amongst members of a group.
3I discuss the implications of this assumption in appendix A.
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Utility maximising agents will enter a risk sharing agreement if their utility from
sharing risk is higher than in the single state. The single state refers to the situation
in which an agent does not share risk and instead bears their risk alone. Equation
3.4 shows that in this model, the utility from sharing risk in a given risk sharing
group is fully described by its risk premium. To illustrate how the decision to
share risk changes when the premium accounts for non-zero covariances between
idiosyncratic shocks of insurance partners, it is therefore sufficient to compare the
risk premia in equation 3.5 - 3.7.4
Πsinglej =
α
2
[
σ2i + σ
2
v
]
(3.5)
vs.
Πidj =
α
2
1
4
∑
j={i,−i}
σ2j + σ
2
v
 (3.6)
vs.
Πcovj =
α
2
1
4
∑
j={i,−i}
σ2j +
1
2
Cov(ei, e−i) + σ2v
 (3.7)
In the single state, in equation 3.5, the agent does not share their idiosyncratic
risk σi, whereas equation 3.6 and 3.7 show the risk premia when two agents do
enter a risk sharing agreement. The difference between these two equations is that
Πidj ignores the covariance between idiosyncratic shocks Cov(ei, e−i), whereas Πcovj
accounts for it. Since the risk premium increases in the covariance between idiosyn-
cratic shocks, the utility from sharing risk decreases in the covariance. This means
that two agents who face shocks that have positive covariance are less suitable
as risk sharing partners as the probabilities of experiencing a negative shock are
positively correlated. Ideally, risk sharing partners should have negatively related
shocks so that when one faces a negative shock, the risk sharing partner can share
their positive income shock to compensate. Furthermore, the comparison of risk
4Note that since by definition the common shock is independently distributed from idiosyn-
cratic shocks, the covariances between the common and idiosyncratic shocks are zero Cov(v, e) = 0.
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premia shows that the variance of the village-wide shock, σ2v , which is defined as
the intersection of all idiosyncratic shocks, is common to all states, which implies
that it is uninsurable through mutual insurance as it affects all agents.
Equation 3.7 illustrates that an agent picks their risk sharing partner based on the
variance of the partner’s idiosyncratic shock, and on the covariance between the
partner’s and their own idiosyncratic shock. Since the utility from risk sharing can
be summarised by the risk premium alone, an agent will enter a risk sharing group
if the risk premium of the group is lower than that of the single state Πcov < Πsingle.
Proposition 3.2.1 In equilibrium with all other variables equal, risk premia in
risk sharing groups for individuals i ∈ j and i′ ∈ j′, with σ2i < σ2i′, will be such that
Πcovj ≤ Πcovj′
The proof follows directly from equation 3.7.
Proof With all other variables equal, σ2i < σ2i′ implies
∑
j={i,k} σ
2
j <
∑
j′={i′,k} σ
′2
j ,
where k is any third agent in the economy. Hence, if i and i′ are members of two
distinct risk sharing groups j and j′, then Πcovj ≤ Πcovj′ follows. 
Since the utility of an agent is highest when the risk premium is small, an agent will
seek to enter the risk sharing group in which the sum of shock variances is smallest.
Whilst any agent will always prefer to share risk with agents whose shock variance
is small, the agent themself will only be accepted in a risk sharing group if the risk
premium from sharing for the partner is lower than in their single state. Therefore,
matching between agents following this premise yields risk sharing groups that con-
sist of members with similar shock variance or riskiness.
The following proposition concerns the role of covariances between idiosyncratic
shocks.
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Proposition 3.2.2 In equilibrium with all other variables equal, risk sharing coali-
tions will be such that for i ∈ j and i′ ∈ j′, with Cov(ei, ek) < Cov(ei′ , ek), then
Πcovj ≤ Πcovj′ .
Proof Cov(ei, ek) < Cov(ei′ , ek) directly implies Πcovi,k ≤ Πcovi′,k. Hence, k prefers i
to i′ as a risk sharing partner. If i and i′ are members of two distinct risk sharing
groups, the group of i will be the one that generates the lower risk premium in
comparison. 
Utility maximising agents prefer risk sharing partners whose idiosyncratic shock is
non-positively correlated with their own shock. If shocks are positively correlated,
the materialisation of one idiosyncratic shock increases the probability of the other
one materialising too. In this case risk sharing would be futile. However, in a
risk sharing group where the idiosyncratic shocks of the two partners have zero or
negative covariance, the two shocks are independent or counteract each other. The
risk premium reflects this relationship by increasing in a positive, and decreasing in
a negative covariance between idiosyncratic shocks.
3.2.2 Testable Implications
The model suggests that risk sharing partners who match according to utility max-
imisation principles will have the following characteristics:
Testable Implications
I Similar variances of idiosyncratic shocks, and
II Negatively correlated idiosyncratic shocks.
The first implication arises from proposition 3.2.1. Intuitively, it draws on the
rationale that an agent prefers to share risk with another agent who exhibits a
similar level of riskiness as expressed by the idiosyncratic shock variance. Two
similarly risky agents can reduce their risk premium by sharing risk relative to
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the single state. However, forming a risk sharing group with a partner who is
substantially more risky will lead to a risk premium that is higher than that in the
single state. The second implication arises from proposition 3.2.2 and it concerns
insurability. The ideal risk sharing partner experiences economic prosperity when
the agent themself faces a negative shock. This is to ensure that risk sharing
partners are capable of compensating one another for shock related losses.
3.3 Data & Sample Characteristics
I test these implications using data from De Weerdt (2004), which contain a com-
plete map of the insurance network of a small Haya village in Tanzania. The dyadic
data, in which each observation is a description of the relationship between two
households, have information on all insurance links between households within the
village. Figure 3.1 illustrates the network structure graphically.
3.3.1 Data Description
The strengths of links in the data vary from ‘no link’, ‘unilateral link’, to ‘recipro-
cal link’. Since the network is undirectional, which implies that the link of A to B
is identical to the one of B to A, ’unilateral’ and ’reciprocal’ do not indicate the
direction of a link but rather the strength of the tie. This is due to the phrasing
of the network identification question, which infers reciprocity: “Can you give a
list of people from inside or outside of Nyakatoke, who you can personally rely on
for help and/or that can rely on you for help in cash, kind or labour". This insur-
ance link variable serves as the endogenous variable in the empirical analysis. The
dyadic data also inform about kinship ties and geographical distance between any
two households.
In addition to the dyadic data, I have survey data on each household in the vil-
lage. These include information on clan and religious membership of the household,
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Figure 3.1: Risk sharing network structure
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(b) Unilateral links
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(c) Reciprocal links
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Note: Illustration of the informal insurance network
split base on all links in panel A, only unilateral links
in B, and only reciprocal links in C.
weekly consumption, land ownership, and the value of livestock. Furthermore, for
each adult in the household there is data on age, education, sex and their income
portfolio. The income portfolio data consists of seven categories covering income
from livestock, trade, assets, processing of agricultural produce, casual labour and
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income from other off-farm work. Each category is represented by a dummy variable
that indicates whether a household member accrues income from it. This informa-
tion allows to derive a measure of income diversification to proxy for the shock
variance of a household and the covariance between the idiosyncratic shocks of two
households.
3.3.2 Sample Characteristics
In table 3.1, I present descriptive statistics for the sample at the household level,
which consists of 119 households. On average, a household consists of 2 adult
household members, and in 11% of households, none of the members have education.
In 17% of households, the most educated household member started primary school,
and in 57% the most educated household member finished primary school education.
In 8% of households, at least one member has secondary school education, and for
8%, information on education is missing. On average, the oldest household member
in a household is 46 years old. Mean weekly food consumption across five rounds
of surveys is TZS 1308 (approx. EUR 1.64 on 1 Jan 2000), non-food consumption
is TZS 314.25 and total consumption is TZS 1622.71. The average household owns
1.35 acres of land and livestock worth TZS 54659.66. In total, a household is active
in three income categories, and each household member in two on average. 50% of
households earn income from casual labour, 36% from trade, 93% from crops, 27%
from livestock, 0.6% from other assets, 35% from processing agricultural produce,
and 34% from other off farming activities. Finally, each household has on average
5.38 bilateral risk sharing agreements.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Demographics
# Households 119
# Adult HH Members 1.77 0.65
No Education 0.11 0.31
Started Primary School 0.17 0.38
Completed Primary School 0.57 0.50
(Some) Secondary School 0.08 0.28
Age Oldest HH Member 45.72 16.50
Panel B: Consumption
Food Consumption (TZS) 1301.14 462.83
Non-Food Consumption (TZS) 310.55 341.67
Total Consumption (TZS) 1611.83 675.84
Panel C: Wealth
Land owning (acres) 1.34 1.26
Livestock (TZS) 53747.46 187187.34
Panel D: Income
# Income Categories 2.80 1.14
# Income Categories PP 2.04 0.74
Other Off Farm 0.35 0.48
Casual Labour 0.50 0.50
Trade 0.35 0.48
Crop 0.93 0.26
Livestock 0.27 0.44
Assets 0.06 0.24
Processing 0.35 0.48
Panel E: Network
# Links 5.38 3.02
Note: Consumption in panel B and value of livestock in
panel D are expressed in terms of Tanzanian Shillings.
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3.4 Estimation & Methods
3.4.1 Proxies for Shock Variances and Shock Covariances
In the empirical analysis, I examine whether the theoretical results regarding the
role of risk heterogeneity in the formation of risk sharing agreements is borne out
by the data. The model suggests that in equilibrium only those risk sharing agree-
ments that make the partners better off than the single state exist. All else equal,
this will be the case when risk sharing partners have similar idiosyncratic shock
variances, ie. face similar levels of riskiness, and their shocks have negative covari-
ance. I test whether two households who identify as risk sharing partners have on
average more similar shock variances than those households who do not, and if a
negative covariance of shocks predicts risk sharing.
I construct proxies to analyse each of the two predictions. First, as a measure of a
household’s idiosyncratic shock variance, I use data on income categories to build a
proxy based on the income diversification of a household. I argue that in the con-
text of rural farmers the riskiness of a household is reflected in the diversification of
their income profile. The more diversified the composition of the income profile, the
less sensitive the household is to shocks that affect individual income categories. I
measure the level of diversification as the average number of income sources across
all household members.
Secondly, to measure the covariance of idiosyncratic shocks, I compute the covari-
ance of income profiles weighted by the number of household members active in
each category. I compute the covariance between the income profile of household A
and B as
CovA,B =
C∑
c=1
(nA,c − n¯A)(nB,c − n¯B)
C
where c refers to the different income categories, n·,c to the number of people per
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household working in income category c, and n¯ is the average number of people
working in a category per household.
This variable is a measure of the degree to which the income profiles of two house-
holds are interdependent. If the covariance is positive for two households, their
income profiles are related as they rely on the same income source to a similar
extent in terms of total income shares. If the covariance is negative, the opposite
is true and if the covariance equals zero, there is no relationship between the two
income profiles. To proxy for the probability that two households are likely to suffer
similar shocks, I use a binary variable that is equal to one if the covariance is greater
than zero, and zero otherwise.
As the outcome variable in all regressions, I use the binary link variable in the dyadic
data set that indicates whether a link between two households exists, treating both
unilateral and reciprocally links as identical.
3.4.2 Methods
Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) identify two issues regarding identification and in-
ference with estimating a dyadic model like this one. In what follows, I use largely
the same notation as the authors for the ease of reference.
Identification
In a dyadic data set, each observation is a description of the link between two
households k and l, and contains information on link attributesWkl, and information
on each household in the dyad (Zk, Zl). The regressors must enter the dyadic
regression in a way that ensures that the effect of dyad attributes (Zk, Zl) on ykl is
the same as the effect of (Zl, Zk) on ylk. Since this paper uses undirectional data,
which means that ykl = ylk, I can rewrite this requirement as βZkl = βZlk. The
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regression satisfies this criterion by including both the sum and the difference of
the household attributes as regressors, which leads to estimating an equation of the
form
ykl = α + β1|Zk − Zl|+ β2(Zk + Zl) + φ|Wkl|+ ηkl
Even though the main coefficients of interest in this study are β1 and φ and the
identification issue concerns β2, I briefly discuss it for completeness. Identification of
β2 hinges on variation in the number of insurance links that a household maintains
as the coefficient on the sum of household attributes is only identified if the number
of links varies across the sample. To provide an intuitive illustration of this issue, I
paraphrase the example given in Fafchamps and Gubert (2007): If the dyadic data
in this sample consisted entirely of risk sharing households with strictly one risk
sharing partner, I could estimate with β1 whether households with more similar
shock variances are more likely to share risk, but not whether households with
higher shock variance are more likely to share risk, since all households have only
one risk sharing partner. In other words, the estimation would allow to identify the
influence of the differences in attributes but not the influence of the sum. As shown
in table 3.1, the number of links in this sample varies, which implies that both β1
and β2 are identified in my regressions.
Inference
The second issue arises due to the fact that there are idiosyncratic factors affecting
the outcome that are uniform for all observations involving a individual. This
implies that E(ηkl, ηkm) is likely not zero for all k. Similarly, I have to expect
that E(ηkl, uml) 6= for all l, E(ηkl, ηmk) 6= 0, and E(ηkl, ηlm) 6= 0. I correct for
this correlation by calculating the standard errors using a covariance matrix that
accounts for cross-observation correlation as proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert
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(2007).5
3.4.3 Estimation
This leads to the following set of models that I use to test the implications from
the model in section 3.2.2. I estimate equation 3.8 to test whether risk sharing
partners have similar shock variances. The outcome variable ykl indicates whether
households k and l form a risk sharing group and the coefficient β1 estimates the
correlation between the difference in the number of income categories per person of
the two households k and l, and β2 the sum of categories. The coefficient β1 is the
main coefficient of interest in this equation and the model predicts that it assumes a
negative sign. The control vector Wkl contains dyad level controls like geographical
distance and kinship relationship between household k and l, and ηkl is the error
term.
ykl = α + β1|No. income sourcesk − No. income sourcesl|+ (3.8)
+β2(No. income sourcesk + No. income sourcesl) + φ|Wkl|+ ηkl
ykl = α + γ1|Covariancekl|+ φ|Wkl|+ ηkl (3.9)
ykl = α + δ1|No. income sourcesk − No. income sourcesl|+ (3.10)
+δ2(No. income sourcesk + No. income sourcesl) +
+δ3Covariancekl + φ|Wkl|+ ηkl
Similarly, in equation 3.9, I test the second theoretical implication by estimating the
correlation between the probability of the household k and l forming an insurance
group and the indicator Covariancekl that equals one if the covariance of the income
5Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) provide a STATA command to estimate the standard errors
according to the covariance
A Var(βˆ) =
1
N −M (X
′X)−1
(
N∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
N∑
m=1
N∑
n=1
gklmn
2N
Xklηklη
′
mnXmn
)
(X ′X)−1
The STATA command is called nreg and is available as ado file from their website.
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profiles of the two households is greater than zero. The model predicts that γ1
assumes a negative value. Finally, I estimate 3.10 to test whether the similarity of
shock variances and the covariance of shocks are both jointly significant predictors
of risk sharing.
3.5 Results
The results from estimating equation 3.8 are presented in table 3.2, and from equa-
tion 3.9 and 3.10 in table 3.3. I estimate each equation with OLS and unclus-
tered standard errors in the top panel, and with dyadic standard errors following
Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) in the bottom panel. I also estimate all the equa-
tions with a Probit model in table B.1 in appendix B to show that the results are
qualitatively similar to the OLS.
The results in table 3.2 document that the likelihood of two households sharing risk
increases in the similarity of their shock variances. In particular, households with
a similar number of income sources per adult household member are more likely to
form risk sharing groups. Since wealthier households are less sensitive to idiosyn-
cratic income shocks as they are better able to compensate with other means, I
also show that this relationship is significant when I use measures of wealth, such
as land owning, as an alternative proxy for the shock variance. Interestingly, the
coefficient on the difference in land owning switches signs when I control for the
sum. This suggests that the positive effect of the difference, without controlling for
the sum, is driven by omitted variable bias, which likely stems from the fact that
wealthier households are more attractive as risk sharing partners.
To show that the correlation of risk sharing and similar levels of diversification is
not driven by wealth effects, I also present estimations of the joint model of income
diversification and land owning with dyad level controls in the last column. Since
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Table 3.2: Differences in shock variances
Probability of Risk Sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Unclustered Std. Errors
∆(# Income Sources) -0.0089* -0.0113** -0.0106**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)∑
(# Income Sources) 0.0050 0.0039
(0.003) (0.003)
∆(Land Owning) 0.0071***-0.0150***-0.0123***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)∑
(Land Owning) 0.0213***0.0211***
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 6328 6328 7021 7021 6328
Panel B: Dyadic Std. Errors
∆(# Income Sources) -0.0089* -0.0113* -0.0106*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)∑
(# Income Sources) 0.0050 0.0039
(0.005) (0.004)
∆(Land Owning) 0.0071 -0.0150**-0.0123*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)∑
(Land Owning) 0.0213***0.0211***
(0.006) (0.006)
Observations 12656 12656 14042 14042 12656
Kinship Yes
Geo. Distance Yes
Note: The outcome variable is a binary measure of insurance links that treats unilateral
and reciprocal links as equivalents. ∆(# Income Sources) is the difference in the aver-
age number of income sources per adult household member between the two households
in the dyad,
∑
(# Income Sources) is the sum of the average number of income sources
per adult household member. Analogously for ∆(Land Owning) and ∆(Land Owning).
Standard errors are reported in brackets below the coefficients. In panel A, standard er-
rors are unclustered, and in panel B, I follow Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) in accounting
for any correlation between the error terms of all observations involving one household
by calculating standard errors according to the variance formula they propose, which also
requires to double the dyadic data by adding the sample in reversed dyad sorting.
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both coefficients remain significant, I conclude that similar levels of diversification
in income sources and similar wealth levels jointly predict risk sharing conditional
on covariates. These findings represent strong support for the first testable impli-
cation that risk sharing partners in equilibrium will have similar shock variances.
In the first two columns of table 3.3, I present results for the second implication of
the model that the covariance of the idiosyncratic shocks of risk sharing partners
is negative. The estimates show a negative correlation between the covariance of
income profiles and the probability of risk sharing, thereby confirming the predic-
tion of the model. In the top panel, the coefficient becomes larger in absolute value
and significant at 10% when controlling for kinship relationship and geographical
distance between the households.
In the last two columns of table 3.3, I estimate equation 3.10 by including the differ-
ence in the number of income sources and the sum thereof as independent variables.
I find that the estimated relationship between the covariance and the probability
of risk sharing remains negative, though the estimates become insignificant. The
estimated correlation between the difference in number of income sources and the
outcome variable in this table is almost identical compared to the estimations in
table 3.2. The estimates in the bottom panel with dyadic standard errors show
that the findings are largely robust even though some lose significance due to the
clustering. Overall, these findings provide some evidence that households sort into
risk sharing groups with households such that their income profiles have negative
covariance but the correlation is imprecisely estimated.
To understand whether the lack of sorting to achieve a negative shock covariance
arises due to a shortage in supply of adequate risk sharing partners, I test if wealth-
ier, and thus more attractive, households who have a greater choice of risk sharing
partners, are more likely to adhere to the criterion. By interacting the covariance
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Table 3.3: Covariances of risk profiles, and differences in shock variances
Probability of Risk Sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Unclustered Std. Errors
∆(# Income Sources) -0.0113**-0.0114**
(0.005) (0.005)∑
(# Income Sources) 0.0049 0.0048
(0.003) (0.003)
Income Covariance -0.0094 -0.0118* -0.0048 -0.0104
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 7027 6670 6328 6328
Panel B: Dyadic Std. Errors
∆(# Income Sources) -0.0113* -0.0114*
(0.006) (0.006)∑
(# Income Sources) 0.0049 0.0048
(0.005) (0.005)
Income Covariance -0.0093 -0.0118 -0.0048 -0.0104
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 14042 13340 12656 12656
Kinship Yes Yes
Geo. Distance Yes Yes
Note: The outcome variable is a binary measure of insurance links that treats
unilateral and reciprocal links as equivalents. ∆(# Income Sources) is the dif-
ference in the average number of income sources per adult household member
between the two households in the dyad,
∑
(# Income Sources) is the sum of
the average number of income sources per adult household member. Standard
errors are reported in brackets below the coefficients. In panel A, standard er-
rors are unclustered, and in panel B, I follow Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) in
accounting for any correlation between the error terms of all observations in-
volving one household by calculating standard errors according to the variance
formula they propose, which also requires to double the dyadic data by adding
the sample in reversed dyad sorting.
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Table 3.4: Interaction of covariance with wealth and education
Probability of Risk Sharing
(1) (2)
Panel A: Unclustered Std. Errors
∆(# Income Sources) -0.0105** -0.0101**
(0.005) (0.005)∑
(# Income Sources) 0.0045 0.0035
(0.003) (0.003)
Income Covariance -0.0189 -0.0384
(0.013) (0.037)
Covariance*
∑
(Land Owning) 0.0037
(0.004)
Covariance*
∑
(Education) 0.0054
(0.007)
Observations 6328 6105
Panel B: Dyadic Std. Errors
∆(# Income Sources) -0.0105* -0.0101*
(0.006) (0.006)∑
(# Income Sources) 0.0045 0.0035
(0.004) (0.005)
Income Covariance -0.0189 -0.0384
(0.012) (0.028)
Covariance*
∑
(Land Owning) 0.0037
(0.004)
Covariance*
∑
(Education) 0.0054
(0.006)
Observations 12656 12210
Kinship Yes Yes
Geo. Distance Yes Yes∑
(Land Owning) Yes∑
(Education) Yes
Note: The outcome variable is a binary measure of insurance
links that treats unilateral and reciprocal links as equivalents.
∆(# Income Sources) is the difference in the average number of in-
come sources per adult household member between the two households
in the dyad,
∑
(# Income Sources) is the sum of the average num-
ber of income sources per adult household member. Analogously for∑
(Land Owning) and
∑
(Education). Standard errors are reported
in brackets below the coefficients. In panel A, standard errors are un-
clustered, and in panel B, I follow Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) in
accounting for any correlation between the error terms of all observa-
tions involving one household by calculating standard errors according
to the variance formula they propose, which also requires to double the
dyadic data by adding the sample in reversed dyad sorting.
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of risk profiles with total land owning and education of the dyad in table 3.4, I
estimate whether the correlation between risk sharing and a negative shock covari-
ance is stronger for wealthier and more educated dyads. The estimations show
that neither of these two interactions are significant, which implies that there is no
heterogeneity in the correlation by wealth and education.
3.6 Discussion
3.6.1 Interpretation of Main Results
The theoretical discussion regarding the role of risk profiles in the endogenous for-
mation of risk sharing groups suggests two equilibrium results: Agents will share
risk with partners who exhibit a similar level of riskiness, and the idiosyncratic
shocks of risk sharing partners will have negative covariance. The empirical anal-
ysis shows that these predictions hold true in the case of the insurance network
in a village in rural Tanzania. Controlling for dyad characteristics that influence
the probability of a link regardless of the risk profile, like kinship and geographical
distance, I find that households with similar levels of riskiness and negative risk
covariance are more likely to share risk.
In the context of rural subsistence farmers, like the individuals in this sample, id-
iosyncratic risk is largely related to diversification of income. Households who are
unable to save part of their income have little or no wealth to draw on during times
of economic hardship. In order to minimise risk exposure, households will there-
fore endeavour to spread their income over as many sources as possible. The more
diversified the income, the less they will suffer from an adverse shock on one of
their income sources. To account for this relationship between riskiness and income
diversification, I proxy for the idiosyncratic shock variance by using the number of
income sources per adult household member, and find a significant correlation with
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the probability of risk sharing.
While the correlation between the difference in the number of income sources per
household member and risk sharing could also be driven by a wealth effect, the
estimations in table 3.2 confirms that the correlation remains significant even when
I control for the sum of income sources and wealth via land owning.
Similarly, I compute a measure of the covariance of idiosyncratic shocks based on
households’ income profiles and show that there is a significant negative correlation
between risk sharing and the covariance of household income as expected. How-
ever, significance is not robust to including the difference in shock variances as a
regressor, which suggests that households are less likely to adhere to the theoretical
implication that risk sharing should optimally happen between households whose
shocks have negative covariance.
This may be due to a variety of reasons. First, risk sharing relies on trust and so
risk sharing partners will likely want to know each other well. Outside of kinship
and neighbourhood ties, those people might be business partners or colleagues -
people whose income profiles will inevitably be positively correlated. Or the pool
of potential risk sharing partners is limited and not all households can choose risk
sharing partners who satisfy both criteria. The interactions in table 3.4 do not sub-
stantiate this hypothesis. If wealthier households are more attractive as risk sharing
partners, and are therefore the first to choose from the pool of potential partners,
one would expect the interaction to be negative and significant. However, the corre-
lation between income covariance and risk sharing does not vary significantly with
wealth or education.
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3.6.2 Alternative Measures of the Shock Variance and Co-
variance
The empirical proxies of shock variances and covariances are based on income cat-
egories of household members in the village. I select these measures to reflect the
level of income diversification in a household to capture the shock variance, and the
covariance of income profiles to grasp the covariance between shocks. However, I
do not claim that these are the only conceivable proxies, or the best ones.
An arguably better approximation would be one that uses the monetary income
shares of each income category for each household member to measure the intensive
margin of diversification in addition to the extensive margin measured by binary
income category indicators. In the absence of data on relative income from each cat-
egory, the current measures might be misleading if income shares within households
are very skewed so that the number of categories does not adequately reflect the
diversification of income, and the covariance does not capture the actual covariance
between income profiles.
To test whether the measures in the empirical analysis are appropriate approxima-
tions of the true shock variances and covariances, network data with information
on both the income and risk profiles would be needed, or panel data to reconstruct
measures of riskiness from acyclical variation in income. The data could be used to
estimate the predictive value of the proxies in this study on actual shock variances
and covariances. In the absence of such data, I cannot rule out that the correlations
in the estimations could also be driven by correlated factors other than the variance
and covariance.
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3.7 Conclusion
In the absence of formal insurance products, informal risk pooling agreements are
often the only means of insurance for smallholder farmers in order to smooth in-
come and consumption. In this paper, I analyse the role of risk heterogeneity in
the formation and final composition of such informal risk sharing groups.
The theoretical framework in this paper is a variant of the model by Jaramillo et al.
(2015) and extends their analysis to account for the influence of the covariance
between idiosyncratic shocks in addition to the individual shock variances. In the
model, I derive two testable implications regarding the role of shock variances and
the covariance between idiosyncratic shocks in the decision to endogenously form
risk sharing groups. I find that in equilibrium, risk sharing partners will have sim-
ilar shock variances and negative or zero covariances of idiosyncratic shocks. This
paper is the first to consider this relationship theoretically and explicitly test for it
empirically.
In the empirical analysis, I find that the insurance network in a small rural village
in Tanzania is largely maintained along those equilibrium predictions. In particu-
lar, I find that similar shock variances are positively correlated with the probability
of two households being risk sharing partners. This correlation remains significant
even after controlling for dyad characteristics, wealth and the covariance of shocks.
Furthermore, I find that households are more likely to form risk sharing agreements
if their idiosyncratic shocks have negative covariance. This correlation is significant
after controlling for dyad characteristics that are likely to influence risk sharing
decisions like kinship and geographical distance. However, the correlation seems
weaker than the one with similar shock variances. This suggests that zero or nega-
tive covariance between idiosyncratic shocks plays a less important role in forming
and maintaining risk sharing agreements.
Chapter 3 123
These findings provide avenues for future research. At present, the model does not
account for the influence of secondary links on the equilibrium allocation of risk
sharing partners. However, in reality the suitability of risk sharing partners might
also depend on other risk sharing agreements a household maintains and this might
influence the equilibrium allocation. Moreover, this model is static and does not
allow for renegotiation of risk sharing agreements, and the predictions of the model
may change if it allowed for sequential formation of risk sharing agreements and
renegotiation.
Empirically, future research should build on these findings by confirming that they
hold for other proxies of agents’ risk profiles as discussed in section 3.6.2. Panel
data with information on shocks could be used to measure shock variances and co-
variances more directly. Furthermore, information on transfers between risk sharing
partners would allow to disentangle the relative importance of each theoretical im-
plication for links of different strengths.
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Appendices
A Matching Mechanism
In this section, I use the basic intuition of many-to-many matching models to
demonstrate a possible matching mechanism of risk sharing partners. This allows
to illustrate matching with several bilateral matches per agent.
I assume a frictionless risk sharing market, in which each agent has perfect infor-
mation over the characteristics of all N agents in the economy. Every agent ranks
each of the N − 1 agents relative to the single state. The single state refers to the
situation in which an agent does not share risk and bears their own risk entirely
by themself. These rankings are subjective to each agent and they are determined
in accordance with the risk profile of the potential risk sharing partner and the
correlation between the risk profiles of the agent and the potential partner. The
risk profile of agent i depends on the agent’s idiosyncratic shock ei ∼ (0, σ2ei) with
mean zero and variance σ2ei , and on a shock that is common to all agents v ∼ (0, σ2v)
with mean zero and variance σ2v . An agent’s riskiness is defined by their production
technology, and I assume that the agents have no control over their own position in
the ranking of other agents. This is to account for the fact that agents are unlikely
to factor in the effect on their ranking when maximising profits from production.
This is particularly convincing as there is no aggregate ranking over all agents in
the economy. Instead, each of the N agents has an idiosyncratic ranking for each
of the other N − 1 agents relative to the single state. Any production decision can
thus affect one’s position in the rankings of different agents in opposite ways.
In equilibrium, risk sharing groups are obtained through simultaneous proposals
from every agent to all those agents that rank better in their individual rankings
than the single state. This proposal procedure may result in the least risky agent
receiving up to (N -1) proposals and the riskiest ones receiving none. Any time two
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agents propose a link to each other the link between these two nodes forms. If only
one agent proposes the link, no risk sharing agreement is formed as the receiving
agent does not improve upon their single state by sharing risk with the proposing
agent. Depending on their risk profile an agent can have 0 - (N -1) bilateral risk
sharing partners in equilibrium. Since I assume no limit to the number of risk
sharing partners, there is no need for sequential selection of partners in order to
generate an efficient assignment of risk sharing partners.
I further assume that there are no fixed costs involved in entering a risk sharing
agreement. Sharing risk with many partners is no more costly than sharing risk
with only a few. I assume that regardless of the number of risk sharing partners,
p, an agent allocates a fixed insurance amount κi to any risk sharing agreement. In
order to guarantee that an agent can meet all their liabilities from risk sharing at
any time, κi×p < 1 needs to be satisfied. Total income of any agent is identical for
all agents and normalised to one. The solution of the model shows that the decision
whether or not to propose to an agent is independent of κi as κi does not affect the
ranking. This assumption simplifies the analysis by allowing to abstract from the
effect of second order links between agents on the risk sharing proposal decision.
The decision whether or not to establish a risk sharing agreement is independent of
any other risk sharing agreement that either node might have joined since neither
the total income of a partner nor the share allocated to the agreement matter for
the ranking.
B Additional Tables
Chapter 3 126
Ta
bl
e
B
.1
:
P
ro
bi
t
es
ti
m
at
io
ns
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
of
R
is
k
Sh
ar
in
g
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
∆
(#
In
co
m
e
So
ur
ce
s)
-0
.0
66
4*
-0
.0
81
9*
*
-0
.0
95
7*
*
-0
.0
82
1*
*-
0.
10
13
**
-0
.0
91
0*
*-
0.
09
63
**
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
43
)
∑ (#
In
co
m
e
So
ur
ce
s)
0.
03
54
0.
03
88
0.
03
50
0.
03
93
0.
03
96
0.
03
22
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
26
)
∆
(L
an
d
O
w
ni
ng
)
0.
04
77
**
*-0
.0
87
8*
**-
0.
08
36
**
*
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
27
)
∑ (L
an
d
O
w
ni
ng
)
0.
13
08
**
*0
.1
60
0*
**
0.
09
15
**
*
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
27
)
In
co
m
e
C
ov
ar
ia
nc
e
-0
.0
68
4
-0
.0
96
5*
-0
.0
34
1
-0
.0
83
4
-0
.1
77
7
-0
.3
39
8
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.1
10
)
(0
.3
09
)
C
ov
ar
ia
nc
e*
∑ (L
an
d
O
w
ni
ng
)
0.
03
03
(0
.0
31
)
C
ov
ar
ia
nc
e*
∑ (E
du
ca
ti
on
)
0.
04
84
(0
.0
55
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
63
28
63
28
70
21
70
21
63
28
70
27
66
70
63
28
63
28
63
28
61
05
K
in
sh
ip
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
G
eo
.
D
is
ta
nc
e
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
∑ (E
du
ca
ti
on
)
Y
es
N
ot
e:
T
he
ou
tc
om
e
va
ri
ab
le
is
a
bi
na
ry
m
ea
su
re
of
in
su
ra
nc
e
lin
ks
th
at
tr
ea
ts
un
ila
te
ra
l
an
d
re
ci
pr
oc
al
lin
ks
as
eq
ui
va
le
nt
s.
∆
(#
In
co
m
e
So
ur
ce
s)
is
th
e
di
ffe
re
nc
e
in
th
e
av
er
ag
e
nu
m
be
r
of
in
co
m
e
so
ur
ce
s
pe
r
ad
ul
t
ho
us
eh
ol
d
m
em
be
r
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
tw
o
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
in
th
e
dy
ad
,
∑ (#
In
co
m
e
So
ur
ce
s)
is
th
e
su
m
of
th
e
av
er
ag
e
nu
m
be
r
of
in
co
m
e
so
ur
ce
s
pe
r
ad
ul
t
ho
us
eh
ol
d
m
em
be
r.
A
na
lo
go
us
ly
fo
r
∆
(L
an
d
O
w
ni
ng
)
an
d
∑ (L
an
d
O
w
ni
ng
),
an
d
∑ (E
du
ca
ti
on
).
C
ol
um
n
1-
5
co
rr
es
po
nd
to
ta
bl
e
3.
2,
co
lu
m
n
6-
9
co
rr
es
po
nd
to
ta
bl
e
3.
3,
an
d
co
lu
m
n
10
-1
1
to
ta
bl
e
3.
4.
U
nc
lu
st
er
ed
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
be
lo
w
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
.

Bibliography
Appadurai, A. (2004). The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recog-
nition. In Rao, V. and Walton, M., editors, Culture and Public Action, pages
59–84. Stanford University Press, Palo Alto.
Arrow, K. J. (1963). Liquidity Preference. Lecture IV. Lecture Notes for Economics
285, The Economics of Uncertainty, (undated):33–53.
Attanasio, O. P. and Kaufmann, K. M. (2014). Education choices and returns to
schooling: Mothers’ and youths’ subjective expectations and their role by gender.
Journal of Development Economics, 109:203 – 216.
Autor, D. H. (2014). Skills, Education, and the Rise of Earnings Inequality Among
the “Other 99 Percent”. Science, 344(6186).
Baker, R., Bettinger, E., Jacob, B., Marinescu, I., and Jacob, B. (2017). The Effect
of Labor Market Information on Community College Students‘ Major Choice.
NBER Working Paper, 23333.
Bala, V. and Goyal, S. (2000). A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation.
Econometrica, 68(5):1181–1229.
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change.
Psychological Review, 84(2):191–215.
Bandura, A. (1986). Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive
Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
127
Bibliography 128
Batista, C. and Seither, J. (2018). Reference Points and Entrepreneurship: Evidence
from a Field Experiment on Aspirations, Goal Setting, and Business Skills.
Batista, C. and Vicente, P. C. (2018). Is Mobile Money Changing Rural Africa?
Evidence from a Field Experiment.
Beaman, L., Duflo, E., Pande, R., and Topalova, P. (2012). Female Leadership
Raises Aspirations and Educational Attainment for Girls: A Policy Experiment
in India. Science, 335.
Becker, G. S. (1962). Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis. Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 70(5):9–49.
Becker, G. S. (1964). Human capital : A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,with
Special Reference to Education. New York : Columbia University Press for Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, New York.
Becker, G. S. and Chiswick, B. R. (1966). Education and the Distribution of Earn-
ings. The American Economic Review, 56(1):358–369.
Becker, G. S. and Tomes, N. (1979). An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of
Income and Intergenerational Mobility. Journal of Political Economy, 87(6):1153–
1189.
Becker, G. S. and Tomes, N. (1986). Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of
Families. Journal of Labor Economics, 4(3):1–39.
Belloni, A., Chernozhukov, V., and Hansen, C. (2014). Inference on Treatment
Effects after Selection among High-Dimensional Controls. Review of Economic
Studies, 81:608 – 650.
Bernard, T., Dercon, S., Orkin, K., and Taffesse, A. S. (2014). The Future in Mind:
Aspirations and Forward-Looking Behaviour in Rural Ethiopia. CSAE Working
Paper.
Bibliography 129
Besley, T. (2016). Aspirations and the Political Economy of Inequality. Oxford
Economic Papers, 89(1):1 – 35.
Blackwell, L. S., Trzesniewski, K. H., and Dweck, C. S. (2007). Implicit Theories of
Intelligence Predict Achievement Across an Adolescent Transition: A Longitudi-
nal Study and an Intervention. Child Development, 78(1):246–263.
Bramoullé, Y. and Kranton, R. (2007). Risk Sharing across Communities. The
American Economic Review, 97(2):70 – 74.
Breda, T., Grenet, J., Monnet, M., and Effenterre, C. V. (2018). Can Female Role
Models Reduce the Gender Gap in Science? Evidence from Classroom Interven-
tions in French High Schools. PSE Working Papers, 2018 - 06.
Campbell, M. K., DeVellis, B. M., Strecher, V. J., Ammerman, A. S., DeVellis,
R. F., and Sandler, R. S. (1994). Improving dietary behavior: the effectiveness of
tailored messages in primary care settings. American Journal of Public Health,
84(5):783–7.
Carneiro, P. and Heckman, J. J. (2003). Human Capital Policy. In Heckman, J. J.,
Krueger, A. B., and Friedman, B. M., editors, Inequality in America: What Role
for Human Capital Policies? MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Chiswick, B. R. (1969). Minimum Schooling Legislation and the Cross-Sectional
Distribution of Income. The Economic Journal, 79(315):495–507.
Cunha, F. and Heckman, J. J. (2006). Investing in our Young People.
De Weerdt, J. (2004). Risk-Sharing and Endogenous Network Formation. In Der-
con, S., editor, Insurance against Poverty, chapter 10, pages 197–216. Oxford
University Press.
De Weerdt, J. and Dercon, S. (2002). Risk-Sharing and Endogenous Network For-
mation. Foreign Affairs, pages 197–216.
Bibliography 130
Dee, T. S. (2005). A Teacher Like Me: Does Race, Ethnicity, or Gender Matter?
American Economic Review, 95(2):158–165.
DellaVigna, S. and La Ferrara, E. (2015). Economic and Social Impacts of the
Media. In Handbook of Media Economics, chapter 19, pages 724 – 766. Elsevier,
1b edition.
Dercon, S. and Christiaensen, L. (2011). Consumption risk, technology adoption
and poverty traps: Evidence from Ethiopia. Journal of Development Economics,
96(2):159–173.
Education Endowment Fund (2018). The Attainment Gap 2017.
Fafchamps, M. and Gubert, F. (2007). The formation of risk sharing networks.
Journal of Development Economics, 83(2):326–350.
Fafchamps, M. and Lund, S. (2003). Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines.
Journal of Development Economics, 71(2):261–287.
Genicot, G. and Ray, D. (2017). Aspirations and Inequality. Econometrica,
85(2):489–519.
Grimard, F. (1997). Household consumption smoothing through ethnic ties: evi-
dence from Cote d’Ivoire. Journal of Development Economics, 53(2):391–422.
Hanushek, E. A., Schwerdt, G., Wiederhold, S., and Woessmann, L. (2014). Returns
to Skills around the World: Evidence from PIAAC. European Economic Review,
73:103–130.
Hanushek, E. A. and Woessmann, L. (2011). How Much Do Educational Outcomes
Matter in OECD Countries? Economic Policy.
Hastings, J., Neilson, C. A., and Zimmerman, S. D. (2015). The Effects of Earnings
Disclosure on College Enrollment Decisions. NBER Working Paper, 21300.
Bibliography 131
Heckman, J. J. (2000). Policies to Foster Human Capital. Research in Economics,
54:3–56.
Hulleman, C. S. and Harackiewicz, J. M. (2009). Promoting Interest and Perfor-
mance in High School Science Classes. Science, 326:1410 – 1412.
Inglehart, R., Haerpfer, C., Moreno, A., Welzel, C., Kizilova, K., Diez-
Medrano, J., Lagos, M., Norris, P., Ponarin, E., and Puranen, B., editors
(2014). World Values Survey: Round Five - Country-Pooled Datafile Version:
www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp. JD Systems Institute,
Madrid.
J. Clyde Mitchell (ed.) (1969). Social networks in urban situations: analyses of
personal relationships in central African towns. Manchester University Press for
the Institute for Social Research, Manchester.
Jackson, M. O. and Wolinsky, A. (1996). A Strategic Model of Social and Economic
Networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 71(1):44–74.
Jaramillo, F., Kempf, H., and Moizeau, F. (2015). Heterogeneity and the Formation
of Risk-Sharing Coalitions. Journal of Development Economics.
Jensen, R. (2010). The (Perceived) Returns to Education and The Demand for
Schooling. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Karlan, D., Osei, R., Osei-Akoto, I., and Udry, C. (2014). Agricultural Decisions
after Relaxing Credit and Risk Constraints. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
129(2):597–652.
La Ferrara, E. (2016). Mass Media and Social Change: Can We Use Television to
Fight Poverty? Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(4):791–827.
La Ferrara, E., Chong, A., and Duryea, S. (2012). Soap Operas and Fertility:
Evidence from Brazil. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(4):1–
31.
Bibliography 132
Lergetporer, P., Werner, K., and Woessmann, L. (2018). Does Ignorance of Eco-
nomic Returns and Costs Explain the Educational Aspiration Gap? Evidence
from Representative Survey Experiments. CESifo Working Paper, 7000.
Lusher, L., Campbell, D., and Carrell, S. (2018). TAs like me: Racial interactions
between graduate teaching assistants and undergraduates. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 159:203 – 224.
Marcus, B. H., Emmons, K. M., Simkin-Silverman, L. R., Linnan, L. A., Taylor,
E. R., Bock, B. C., Roberts, M. B., Rossi, J. R., and Abrams, D. B. (1998).
Evaluation of Motivationally Tailored vs. Standard Self-Help Physical Activity
Interventions at the Workplace. American Journal of Health Promotion, 12(4).
Meece, J. L., Wigfield, A., and Eccles, J. S. (1990). Predictors of Math Anxi-
ety and Its Influence on Young Adolescents’ Course Enrollment Intentions and
Performance in Mathematics. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82(1):60–70.
Mincer, J. (1958). Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution.
Journal of Political Economy, 66(4):281 – 302.
Nguyen, T. (2008). Information, Role Models and Perceived Returns to Education:
Experimental Evidence from Madagascar. Unpublished.
OECD (2017). Understanding the Socioeconomic Divide in Europe. COPE (Centre
for Opportunity and Equality).
Pratt, J. W. (1964). Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. Econometrica,
32(1):122–136.
Prochaska, J. O., DiClemente, C. C., Velicer, W. F., and Rossi, J. S. (1993). Stan-
dardized, individualized, interactive, and personalized self help program for smok-
ing cessation. Health Psychology.
Raub, W. and Weesie, J. (1990). Reputation and Efficiency in Social Interactions:
An Example of Network Effects. American Journal of Sociology, 96(3):626–654.
Bibliography 133
Ray, D. (2006). Aspirations, Poverty and Economic Change. In Benabou, R.,
Banerjee, A., and Mookherjee, D., editors, What Have We Learnt About Poverty.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Reuben, E., Wiswall, M., and Zafar, B. (2017). Preferences and Biases in Edu-
cational Choices and Labour Market Expectations: Shrinking the Black Box of
Gender. The Economic Journal, 127(604):2153–2186.
Rosenbaum, P. R. (2002). Covariance Adjustment in Randomized Experiments and
Observational Studies. Statistical Science, 17(3):286–327.
Shiffman, S., Paty, J. A., Rohay, J. M., Di Marino, M. E., and Gitchell, J. (2000).
The Efficacy of Computer-Tailored Smoking Cessation Material as a Supplement
to Nicotine Polacrilex Gum Therapy. Archives of Internal Medicine, 160(11):1675.
Social Mobility Report (2017). Social Mobility, the Class Pay Gap and Intergen-
erational Worklessness: New Insights from The Labour Force Survey. Technical
report, Social Mobility Commission, London.
Spencer, S. J., Steele, C. M., and Quinn, D. M. (1999). Stereotype Threat and
Women’s Math Performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35:4 –
28.
Steele, C. M. and Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test
Performance of African Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
69(5):797 – 811.
Townsend, R. M. (1994). Risk and Insurance in Village India. Econometrica,
62(3):539–591.
Udry, C. and Conley, T. (2004). Social Networks in Ghana. Yale University Eco-
nomic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 888.
Walton, G. M. (2014). The New Science of Wise Psychological Interventions. Cur-
rent Directions in Psychological Science, 23(1):73 – 82.
Bibliography 134
Wigfield, A. and Eccles, J. S. (2000). Expectancy-Value Theory of Achievement
Motivation. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 25:68–81.
Wigfield, A., Eccles, J. S., Yoon, K. S., Harold, R. D., Arbreton, A. J. A., Freedman-
Doan, C., and Blumenfeld, P. C. (1997). Change in children’s competence beliefs
and subjective task values across the elementary school years: A 3-year study.
Journal of Educational Psychology, 89(3):451–469.
Young, A. (2017). Channelling Fisher: Randomization Tests and the Statistical
Insignificance of Seemingly Significant Experimental Results. Working paper.
